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TORTFEASOR LIABILITY FOR DISASTER RESPONSE COSTS:
ACCOUNTING FOR THE TRUE COST OF
ACCIDENTS
INTRODUCTION
On January 13, 1982, Air Florida Flight 90 departed from Washing-
ton, D.C.'s National Airport into a heavy snowstorm.' Shortly after
takeoff, the passenger jet struck the 14th Street/Rochambeau Bridge and
crashed into the Potomac River.2 Seventy-eight people were killed.3 The
District of Columbia incurred expenses in excess of $750,000 in rescuing
the survivors, recovering the bodies of those killed in the crash, raising
the airplane and its contents from the river, and performing other related
emergency services.4 The crash apparently was due to Air Florida's fail-
ure to properly de-ice the wings of the aircraft before takeoff.5 In an
action subsequently brought by the District of Columbia to recover these
costs from Air Florida,6 the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit followed established precedent7 and affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the complaint8 with the result that the District of Columbia
taxpayers were left paying for the entire cost of the disaster response
services. 9
Man-made disasters'0 such as the Air Florida crash unfortunately oc-
1. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1982, at Al, col. 6.
2. District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
3. See idL Some of those killed were on the bridge. See id.
4. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1079. The actual damages claimed by the District of
Columbia were described as follows:
property damage to its streets, sidewalks and bridge; damage to its equipment;
substantial extraordinary labor expenses for emergency rescue, salvage and
clean-up operations; special contract costs; and, the costs of providing law en-
forcement officials for a substantial period of time to safeguard and secure the
area of the aforementioned crash.
Complaint of the District of Columbia, filed July 21, 1983, 8, quoted in Brief for Appel-
lee at 5, District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (No. 84-
5041). The claim for damages to the bridge was settled out of court. See Air Florida, 750
F.2d at 1079 n.1.
5. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1982, at A16, col. 2.
6. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1078. The District of Columbia sued primarily on a
theory of equitable cost allocation. See id For a discussion of the equitable cost alloca-
tion doctrine see infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. The other major theory of
recovery was based on the public trust doctrine. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1078. For a
discussion of the public trust doctrine and its application to tortfeasor liability for disaster
response costs, see infra notes 145-64 and accompanying text.
7. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1078. The traditional rule that taxpayers bear the cost
of response services is discussed at length infra notes 40-66 & 124 and accompanying text.
8. See id. at 1086. The district court had dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted. See id. at 1078.
9. See id. at 1080.
10. For the purposes of this Note, a man-made disaster will be defined as any indus-
trial, nuclear or transportation accident, explosion, fire, power failure or other condition
such as the release of injurious environmental contaminants that threaten or cause dam-
age to property, human suffering, hardship or loss of life (modified from Va. Code Ann.
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cur with great frequency in modern society." As human population con-
tinues to grow, and as technology advances, bringing with it useful yet
§ 44-146.16 (1986)). For an elaboration of the disaster concept, see B. Brown, Disaster
Preparedness and the United Nations: Advance Planning for Disaster Relief 5-6 (1979)
(discussing the various meanings of the term "disaster"); Hilliard, Local Government,
Civil Defence and Emergency Planning: Heading for Disaster?, 49 Mod. L. Rev. 476, 481
(1986) ("Major accidents... are perceived as those which by the nature of the hazard or
the number or seriousness of the casualties are likely to create problems far beyond what
it is reasonable to expect the three normal emergency services of police, fire and ambu-
lance to deal with unaided."); Zimmerman, The Relationship of Emergency Management
to Governmental Policies on Man-Made Technological Disasters, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 29,
32 (1985) (compilation of definitions and references to "emergency" in selected environ-
mental legislation pertaining to toxic and hazardous chemicals). The terms "disaster"
and "emergency" are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
This Note focuses on liability for response costs involving only man-made, as opposed
to natural, disasters. Taxpayers always bear the cost of responding to natural disasters
because no fault exists in such situations. The Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and the 1982
Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5202 (1982) [hereinafter the Act], provide limited mon-
etary relief to communities hit by disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes and other
natural disasters. Although the Act principally addresses natural disasters, relief also
may be given to communities hit by man-made disasters. See S. Rep. No. 891, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6925, 6927 (noting
that while the Act relates principally to "physical or natural occurrences," it also can
cover man-made disasters such as Love Canal, though such disasters represent "extreme
case[s] of the acceptable limits" of the Act's coverage). Funding through the Act is lim-
ited, and aid is available only when the President has declared a federal emergency. See
42 U.S.C. § 5141 (1982).
Classifying disasters as either natural or man-made is somewhat misleading, however,
as man-made disasters can be exacerbated and sometimes even initiated by natural forces.
See B. Brown, Disaster Preparedness and the United Nations: Advance Planning for Dis-
aster Relief 6 (1979); B. Raphael, When Disaster Strikes 11 (1986); see also R. Perry,
Comprehensive Emergency Management: Evacuating Threatened Populations 14-21
(1985) (comparing natural and man-made disasters). The managerial problems presented
by man-made and natural disasters, in fact, are very different. See Kasperson & Pijawka,
Societal Response to Hazards and Major Hazard Events: Comparing Natural and Techno-
logical Hazards, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 7, 8 (1985) ("Natural hazards are familiar and
substantial accumulated trial-and-error responses exist to guide management; technologi-
cal hazards are often unfamiliar and lack precedents in efforts at control.").
For further reading in the expanding field of disaster studies, see Man and Society in
Disaster (G. Baker & D. Chapman eds. 1962) (basic reference work in the field of disaster
studies); P. May & W. Williams, Disaster Policy Implementation: Managing Programs
under Shared Governance (1986) (focusing on the intergovernmental implementation of
selected emergency management programs on the federal and state levels); R. Perry,
Comprehensive Emergency Management: Evacuating Threatened Populations (1985)
(focusing in particular on the evacuation aspect of disasters); R. Perry & A. Mushkatel,
Disaster Management (1984) (contemporary study of man-made and natural disasters
and their socioeconomic effects); Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public Ad-
ministration, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. (1985) (special issue entirely devoted to the topic of
emergency management).
11. For example, during the period 1981-83, excluding military aviation accidents,
there were 200 catastrophic accidents (defined as those in which five or more persons are
killed) in the United States resulting in the death of a total of almost 2,000 persons. See
Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1986 Statistical Abstract of the United
States 78 (Chart No. 121) (106th ed. 1985) [hereinafter 1986 Bureau of the Census Statis-
tics]; see also Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, I 1
Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 1 n.1 (1986).
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often dangerous devices and substances, 2 the potential for serious disas-
ters increases.' 3 Bhopal, 4 Three Mile Island, I I the Sandoz Rhine River
contamination,' 6 and Mexico City's gas explosion 7 are some prominent
examples of modem man-made technological disasters that have affected
large numbers of people. Other man-made disasters such as airline
crashes,18 building collapses,' 9 toxic chemical spills and releases,2" fires
and explosions,2' and dam collapses22 that may affect fewer numbers of
12. See National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control, America Burning 7
(1973) [hereinafter America Burning] (noting the novel hazards to firefighting posed by
new materials and products); Kasperson & Pijawka, supra note 10, at 7-8 (1985) ("tech-
nology has emerged as the major source of hazard for modern society"); see also Zimmer-
man, supra note 10, at 29-30 (summarizing information on the incidence of modern
chemical emergencies).
13. R. Perry & A. Mushkatel, supra note 10, at 3; B. Raphael, supra note 10, at 20;
Weinstein, supra note 11, at 1 & n.l.
14. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at Al, col. 6 (initial report on gas leak at Union
Carbide's Bhopal, India chemical plant).
15. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1979, at Al, col. 2 (reporting on the radiation leak at
the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pa.).
16. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1986, at A3, col. 4 (calling this chemical accident "one
of the gravest European ecological disasters in decades").
17. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1984, at A1, col. 6 (reporting on the liquified gas explo-
sion near Mexico City that killed over 250 people and caused the evacuation of 100,000
others).
18. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (seventy-eight people killed in air crash); see also B. Raphael, supra note 10, at 20
(discussing the growth in number of air disasters).
19. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir.) (Kansas
City Hyatt Regency skywalk collapse), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); McFadden,
Building Collapse Takes a Toll on Exhausted Rescue Workers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 27,
1987, at B1, col. 2 (28 people feared dead in Bridgeport, Conn. building collapse); see also
B. Raphael, supra note 10, at 18 (noting problem of the collapse of various man-made
structures).
20. See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th
Cir. 1983) (threatened release or explosion of liquified petroleum gas necessitated evacua-
tion of all persons within one mile of site); see also Hilliard, supra note 10, at 485 (report-
ing on spill in Md. of 13,000 gallons of highly toxic phosphorous trichloride, necessitating
the evacuation of 23,000 people, 418 of whom required treatment at area hospitals); The
Ability to Respond to Toxic Chemical Emergencies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 88-90 (1985) (attachment to
statement of Maj. Harold Spedding, N.J. State Police) (listing 15 toxic chemical releases
in the Linden, NJ. area during a 3-month period).
21. See, e.g., Coburn v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 44 (E.D. Ky. 1977) (Beverly Hills
Supper Club fire); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 686
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (fuel truck explosion and fire); see also B. Raphael, supra note 10, at
18 (briefly summarizing the destructive effects of past building and city fires).
22. See, e.g., State ex reL Dresser Indus. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (Mo.
1980) (en banc) (rupture of mining waste holding pond dam); see also Dam Safety: Hear-
ings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) (statement of Hon. Leo J. Ryan, Chariman of Subcommittee)
(reporting that the Buffalo Creek Dam disaster resulted in 125 persons killed and S50
million in damages and that the Canyon Lake Dam disaster killed 230 people and caused
$100 million in damages); Teton Dam Disaster: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) (statement of
Hon. Leo J. Ryan, Chairman of Subcommitee) (hearings on the 1976 Teton Dam disaster
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people, nevertheless can have an equally severe social and financial im-
pact on local areas.2 3
To respond to such disasters, a myriad of disaster and emergency ser-
vice organizations, ranging from small volunteer groups to large, highly
organized agencies have been established in the United States. z4 The
costs incurred 25 by government response units during a disaster are exac-
that resulted in $1 billion loss to surrounding communities and the death of 11 persons).
See generally P. May & W. Williams, supra note 10, at 81-92 (chapter devoted to issue of
dam safety mobilization).
23. See Settle, Financing Disaster Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery,
45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 101, 101 (1985) ("A disaster can result in severe economic conse-
quences for an afflicted area. State and local monies deplete rapidly, costly liability de-
mands arise in court, and insurance claims increase quickly, placing the community in an
unexpected economic crisis."); see also R. Perry, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that local
communities are the entities most directly subject to the "harsh realities of disasters").
See generally B. Raphael, supra note 10 (extensive analysis of how individuals and com-
munities cope with the effects of catastrophes); Reconstruction Following Disaster (J.
Haas, R. Kates & M. Bowden eds. 1977) (detailed study of the reconstruction process of
communities following a disaster); Man and Society in Disaster (G. Baker & D. Chap-
man eds. 1962) (comprehensive work on the socioeconomic effects of disasters). It has
been estimated that overall expenditures and losses due to technological hazards in the
U.S. "may be as high as $200 to $300 billion or 10-15% of the Gross National Product."
R. Harriss, C. Hohenemser & R. Kates, Our Hazardous Environment, in Environment
20:7, at 8 (1978) (citing, J. Tuller, The Scope of Hazard Management Expenditure in the
U.S., working paper, Hazard Assessment Group, Clark Univ., Worcester, Mass. (1978)).
24. See America Burning, supra note 12, at 18-20 (1973) (discussing the diversity of
fire-fighting service organizations in the United States); see also Drabek, Managing the
Emergency Response, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 85, 85-88 (1985) (surveying various types of
American disaster response units and noting their four distinct structural qualities: local-
ism; lack of standardization; unit diversity; and fragmentation). Among the types of dis-
aster response activities are search and rescue, evacuation, fire-fighting, emergency
medical care and securing of the impact site. See R. Perry, supra note 10, at 6.
25. Substantial amounts have been sought in various response cost recovery actions.
See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 195 (1967) ($3,081,000
to raise sunken barge containing large amounts of a toxic substance); District of Colum-
bia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (over $750,000 in airplane
crash response costs); City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323
(9th Cir. 1983) ($41,954.81 in evacuation and related costs); Town of East Troy v. Soo
Line R.R., 653 F.2d 1123, 1126 (7th Cir. 1980) ($543,000 in water pollution abatement
costs), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); United States v. Denver & R. G. W. R.R., 547
F.2d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1977) ($22,514.28 in direct fire suppression costs and
$5,628.57 in "overhead"); United States v. Boone, 476 F.2d 276, 277 (10th Cir. 1973)
($31,475.11 for fire suppression and property damage); United States v. American Oil
Co., 417 F.2d 164, 170 (5th Cir. 1969) ($89,676.60 in firefighting services and supplies),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970); United States v. Andrews, 206 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D.
Idaho 1961) ($24,616.68 for cost of fire suppression and restoration of burned area); Peo-
ple v. Southern Cal. Edison, 56 Cal. App. 3d 593, 597, 128 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1976)
($21,584.19 in fire suppression costs); People v. Wilson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 574, 575, 49
Cal. Rptr. 792, 793 (1966) ($14,772.29 in fire suppression costs); Mayor of Morgan City
v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 686-87 (La. Ct. App. 1984) ($38,267.03 for fuel
oil fire suppression costs and damage to emergency equipment and city streets); Brandon
Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 182, 263 N.W.2d 326, 327-28
(1977) (balance of $15,431.96 for emergency dam repair costs); Department of Envtl.
Protection v. Arlington Warehouse, 203 N.J. Super. 9, 12, 495 A.2d 882, 884 (App. Div.
1985) (over $1,200,000 for cleanup of chemical products discharged in fire). Lesser
amounts have been sought in a number of other actions. See, e.g., United States v.
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erbated by such factors as an extraordinary amount of labor required to
contain the disaster,26 the necessity of purchasing or renting special
materials or equipment,2 7 and damage sustained by emergency service
equipment during response efforts.2"
The courts traditionally have held that the taxpayers must bear the
entire cost of such services, even if the disaster was caused by negligence
or recklessness on the part of a tortfeasor2 9 This rule may not be the
most equitable solution to the problem, however, especially in modem
society. Due to a number of factors, 0 including recent cuts in federal
revenue-sharing programs,3 local municipalities are facing very tight
Morehart, 449 F.2d 1283, 1283 (9th Cir. 1971) (S9,736.58 for fire suppression); United
States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1942) ($1,928.20 in fire sup-
pression costs); State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 129 Misc.2d 371, 372, 493 N.Y.S.2d
255, 256 (Nassau County Ct. 1985) ($3,660.12 in labor and $1,603.06 in equipment for
diversion of highway traffic in vicinity of fallen power lines).
26. See, eg., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th
Cir. 1983) (overtime pay); Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 120
(3d Cir. 1983) (same); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685,
687 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (same); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 NJ. Super. 169,
171, 369 A.2d 49, 50 (Law Div. 1976) (same); Brief for Appellant at 6 n.2, District of
Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (No. 84-5041) (extensive
overtime and holiday pay). Obviously, with a volunteer fire department or other volun-
teer response agency, such costs would not be incurred.
27. See, eg., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th
Cir. 1983) (purchase of food for evacuated residents); Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils.
Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (emergency purchases required in responding to
nuclear incident); United States v. American Oil Co., 417 F.2d 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1969)
(over $35,000 worth of chemical foam used in extinguishing ship fire), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1036 (1970); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 686
(La. Ct. App. 1984) ($9,720.00 for chemical foam used in fighting fire); City of Bridgeton
v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 171, 369 A.2d 49, 50 (Law Div. 1976) (special
chemicals and equipment purchased in response to oil spill); Brief for Appellant at 7 n.2,
District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (No. 84-5041)
($85,000 for rental of special equipment, primarily cranes, to raise airplane wreckage
from river).
28. See, eg., United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1942)
(some firefighting equipment destroyed in suppressing forest fire); Mayor of Morgan City
v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 686 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (damaged fire trucks,
damaged and lost fire equipment and nozzles, and damaged electrical equipment); Com-
plaint of the District of Columbia, filed July 21, 1983, 8, quoted in Brief for Appellee at
5, District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (No. 84-5041)
(equipment damaged in air crash response operation).
29. See infra notes 40-66 & 124 and accompanying text.
30. One factor is the erosion of the principle of sovereign immunity that has proven
costly to local governments because of the increase in successful liability suits. See Inter-
national City Management Ass'n, 1985 Municipal Yearbook 71 (1985); Kusler, Liability
as a Dilemma for Local Managers, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 118, 119-20 (1985).
At the same time, insurance companies recently have raised premiums and even can-
celled municipal liability insurance policies, thereby placing even greater financial pres-
sures on local governments. See International City Management Ass'n, 1986 Municipal
Yearbook 63 (1986); see also N.Y. Times, July 21, 1986, at B5, col. 1 (reporting that
towns in the N.Y. metropolitan area are trying to form their own insurance systems in an
eff'ort to avoid staggering rate increases for liability insurance).
31. See Herbers, States Act to Give Localities More Power to Collect Taxes, N.Y.
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budgets.32 The great frequency and severity of modem man-made disas-
ters with their associated financial effects only add to existing pressures
on state, county and local government budgets.33 It is more equitable
under these circumstances to allocate the costs of disaster response serv-
ices to tortfeasors, rather than to taxpayers who are free from any
wrongdoing.
Furthermore, the traditional rule of tortfeasor non-liability is inconsis-
tent with the established tort principle of liability of negligent parties for
harm proximately caused.34 A number of limited exceptions to the rule
of non-liability of negligent tortfeasors for the cost of response services
have, in fact, been recognized by the courts. 35 In addition, several other
theories of recovery such as the public trust doctrine36 and strict liability
for abnormally dangerous activities37 recently have been considered by
some courts.
This Note argues for broader recognition of common law liability of
negligent tortfeasors for disaster response costs incurred by municipali-
ties, state and local governments.38 Part I discusses the traditional rule
Times, Feb. 9, 1987, at A14, col. 2 (reporting that since 1986 when Congress eliminated
general revenue sharing, which had provided $4 billion a year to cities and counties,
many local governments have desperately been seeking new ways to finance basic public
services).
32. See id.; see also Rybeck, The Property Tax as a Super User Charge, in The Prop-
erty Tax and Local Finance 134 (C. Harriss ed. 1983) (noting that due to federal spend-
ing cutbacks, local governments are being "forced to cut corners to meet urgent service
needs").
33. See Settle, supra note 23, at 102-03; see also America Burning, supra note 12, at 5
(noting that the financial plight of local governments leads to greater pressure on fire
departments to produce favorable cost/benefit ratios). In addition, some municipalities
also are facing an increasing scarcity of volunteers for emergency service units. See John-
son, Suburban Fire and Rescue Services Have Worrisome Volunteer Shortage, N.Y. Times,
May 19, 1986, at B1, col. 1 (reporting on the critical manpower shortage on volunteer fire
and rescue squads in New York City suburbs, raising concerns about the adequacy of
emergency response services particularly where new commuting population has little
time for volunteering).
34. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
35. See City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir.
1983). Although denying recovery to plaintiff, the court in City of Flagstaff recognized
several instances when recovery for the cost of response services has been allowed: when
authorized by statute or regulation, when required to effect the intent of federal legisla-
tion, when the acts of a private party create a public nuisance that the government seeks
to abate, and, when the government incurs expenses to protect its own property. See id.
at 324.
Recovery for response costs also has been allowed both on the theory of quasi-contract,
Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 183, 263 N.W.2d 326,
328 (1977), and on a breach of contract theory, United States v. Morehart, 449 F.2d
1283, 1284 (9th Cir. 1971); see also infra notes 179-92 and accompanying text.
36. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080-86 (D.C. Cir.
1984). For a full discussion of the public trust doctrine, see infra notes 145-64 and ac-
companying text.
37. For elaboration of the strict liability theory of recovery, see infra notes 165-78 and
accompanying text.
38. This Note argues only for reimbursement for the cost of services and materials
used in response to the occurrence of a particular disaster. It does not argue for reim-
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against common law liability and responds to the major arguments
against expansion of such liability. Part II argues in favor of expanded
liability for response costs under negligence, public nuisance, protection
of government property, public trust, strict liability, quasi-contract, and
contract theories. Part III outlines statutory bases for recovery as an
alternative to common law liability. This Note concludes that disaster
response costs should be recoverable from negligent tortfeasors" either
under common law or, alternatively, by statutory authority.
I. TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW RULE OF NON-LIABILITY
Courts traditionally have declined to impose common law liability on
tortfeasors for the cost of disaster response services.' This rule emerges
most frequently in fire suppression cases, almost all of which reject com-
mon law liability.4" The rule also surfaces in a variety of disaster con-
bursement of the capital costs of buildings, equipment and other infrastructure that tax-
payers would continue to subsidize. For one case attempting, albeit unsuccessfully, to
recover "overhead" costs see United States v. Denver & R. G. W. R.R., 547 F.2d 1101,
1104-06 (10th Cir. 1977) (awarding direct costs of fire suppression but denying recovery
of overhead or indirect costs).
Similarly, financial responsibility for disaster management plan preparation also would
continue to rest with the taxpayer. Consider, however, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion requirements for nuclear power plant operators to prepare, at their own cost, on-site
emergency response plans, see 10 C.F.R. § 50.47 (1986) and Emergency Planning Around
U.S. Nuclear Powerplants Nuclear Regulatory Commission Oversight-Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95
(1979) (addendum to record submitted by Hon. Toby Moffett, Rep. Conn.), and the trend
in Britain to require certain industries to do the same. See Hilliard, supra note 10, at 484
(noting that these regulations not only require manufacturers to prepare on-site emer-
gency plans but also allow local authorities to recover from manufacturers the cost of
preparing off-site plans).
39. This Note does not address liability of intentional actors, such as arsonists, for
disaster response costs. Actions for restitution from criminals involve issues beyond the
scope of this Note.
40. See, eag., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (aircrash response cost recovery action following the general common law rule of
other jurisdictions that negligent tortfeasors are not liable for disaster response costs);
City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1983)
(denying recovery at common law of costs incurred during response to toxic chemical
railroad tank car incident); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 NJ. Super. 169, 178-
80, 369 A.2d 49, 54-55 (Law Div. 1976) (no recovery at common law of cost of response
services provided during oil spill incident); see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton &
D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 2 at 7 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
Prosser & Keeton] ("The state never can sue in tort in its political or governmental ca-
pacity, although as the owner of property it may resort to the same tort actions as any
individual proprietor to recover for injuries to the property, or to recover the property
itself.") (footnotes omitted).
41. See, e.g., Allenton Volunteer Fire Dep't v. Soo Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 422, 424
(E.D. Wis. 1974) (claim for recovery of cost of suppressing fires dismissed); People v.
Wilson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576-77, 49 Cal. Rptr. 792, 794 (1966) ("No case has been
cited, and we have found none, which permits, in the absence of a statute, the recovery of
fire suppression expenses by one not protecting his own property. Thus, recovery for fire
suppression expenses by a state or other public agency is a creature of statute.") (citation
omitted); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App.
19871 1007
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texts such as toxic chemical spills, 42 airline crashes, 43 and power
failures." This traditional rule is said to be justified for a variety of rea-
1984) (denying recovery of fire suppression costs in absence of authorizing statute); Town
of Freetown v. New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 384 Mass. 60, 61-62, 423 N.E.2d 997,
997-98 (1981) (denying recovery of fire-fighting costs on private land); Town of Howard
v. Soo Line R.R., 63 Wis. 2d 500, 503, 217 N.W.2d 329, 330 (1974) (noting defendant's
argument that in the absence of statute, no recovery for fire suppression services).
42. See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting tortfeasor liability for costs incurred by city in responding to inci-
dent involving derailed tank cars containing liquified gas).
43. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (denying recovery of costs incurred by government in response to air crash).
44. See Koch v. Consolidated Edison Co., 62 N.Y.2d 548, 560-61, 468 N.E.2d 1, 7-8,
479 N.Y.S.2d 163, 170 (1984) (cost of blackout disaster response services not recoverable
at common law), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1210 (1985). The court in Koch examined other
cases on point and held:
[t]he general rule is that public expenditures made in the performance of gov-
ernmental functions are not recoverable. The general rule is grounded in con-
siderations of public policy, and we perceive nothing in the different and
somewhat closer relationship between Con Edison and plaintiffs in this case
which would warrant departure from that rule.
Koch, 62 N.Y.2d at 560-61, 468 N.E.2d at 8, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 170 (footnote and citations
omitted).
There are a number of cases that reject common law liability of public utilities for the
cost of response services provided by the government during other types of utility-caused
emergencies. See, e.g., In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 855-56
(M.D. Pa. 1982) (in action to recover from public utility the costs incurred by municipali-
ties during emergency response to nuclear incident at Three Mile Island, court follows
rule of no recovery in tort absent statutory authority), aff'd in part, vacated, and re-
manded in part sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d
Cir. 1983); State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 129 Misc. 2d 371, 376, 493 N.Y.S.2d 255,
259 (Nassau County Ct. 1985) (denying plaintiff leave to amend complaint to include cost
of labor and equipment used in diverting traffic on highway near fallen power lines owned
by defendant and granting summary judgment for defendant); City of Pittsburgh v. Equi-
table Gas Co., - Pa. Commw. -, -, 512 A.2d 83, 84 (1986) (denying recovery of cost
of supplying police personnel to gas line explosion site), petition denied, 520 A.2d 1386
(1987); Department of Natural Resources v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d
403, 407, 321 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1982) ("Any liability for the cost of extinguishing the
instant fire must be imposed by statute, for there is no common law liability permitting a
governmental entity to charge an electric utility for fire suppression expenses.") (citation
omitted). But cf Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 415 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957 (1969) (holding a privately-owned power company liable for
fire-fighting costs pursuant to provision of special use permit). The rule against public
utility liability for emergency response costs makes sense because the taxpayers on whose
behalf the suit is brought, for the most part, are identical to the utility rate-payers upon
whom the cost of any judgment would fall.
The rule against common law liability for the cost of government services also has
surfaced in a line of cases involving suits to recover from criminals or criminal suspects
the costs incurred during their apprehension or detention. See Department of Mental
Hygiene v. Hawley, 59 Cal. 2d 247, 251, 379 P.2d 22, 24-25, 28 Cal. Rptr. 718, 720-21
(1963); Napa State Hosp. v. Yuba County, 138 Cal. 378, 381, 71 P. 450, 452 (1903); State
Highway & Pub. Works Comm'n v. Cobb, 215 N.C. 556, 558-59, 2 S.E.2d 565, 567
(1939); see also Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 2, at 7-8 ("It has been held ... that
the state as a government has no cause of action against an escaped convict for the ex-
penses incurred in recaptur[ing him]."); cf County of Champaign v. Anthony, 33 II1.
App. 3d 466, 466-67, 337 N.E.2d 87, 87-88 (1975) (no recovery of $10,287.50 for police
protection services provided witness threatened by defendant), aff'd, 64 Ill. 2d 532, 356
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sons including a pre-existing duty of government to act, "settled expecta-
tions" and the rule that economic loss generally is not recoverable in tort.
A. Pre-existing Duty of Government to Act
A primary rationale for the general rule is that the provision of emer-
gency response services is a traditional government duty funded by tax-
payers.45 In essence, the argument is that no legal cause of injury results
when response services are provided without charge to tortfeasors be-
cause the government is merely performing its pre-existing duty.
46
For instance, in City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Ina,' a New Jersey
court denied recovery48 of excessive fire prevention and emergency
N.E.2d 561 (1976). But see County of Champaign v. Anthony, 33 Ill. App. 3d 466, 469-
70, 337 N.E.2d 87, 89-90 (1975) (Trapp, J., dissenting) (arguing for the imposition of
liability on the grounds that the police protection provided the witness for 2 months
constituted "unusual services provided at an additional expense to the county" and that,
even though precedent was against allowing recovery of such costs, "[o]ur courts have,
however, adopted new concepts of liability where it was deemed that public interest re-
quired the imposition of liability."), aff'd, 64 Ill. 2d 532, 356 N.E.2d 561 (1976).
Along these lines, a statute recently has been passed in West Virginia that authorizes
county commissions and municipalities to seek reimbursement from convicts for cost of
medical care and clothing provided to them by county jails. See W. Va. Code § 7-8-2
(Supp. 1986).
Finally, it is interesting to note that the rule at common law against liability for the
cost of such governmental services as police and fire-fighting also has been applied to a
civil protest. See County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone Alliance, 178 Cal. App. 3d 848,
223 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1986) (denying recovery in tort for expenses incurred by county in its
exercise of police powers during civil disobedience protest of a nuclear power plant).
45. See, eg., Town of Freetown v. New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 384 Mass. 60,
61, 423 N.E.2d 997, 998 (1981) (denying recovery of excessive firefighting expenses:
"[governmental] [s]afeguards against fire are maintained 'for the benefit of the public and
without pecuniary compensation or emolument' ") (quoting Tainter v. Worcester, 123
Mass. 311, 316 (1877)); Portsmouth v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 100 N.H. 249,
253, 123 A.2d 827, 830 (1956) (denying recovery of costs of fire suppression services upon
finding that plaintiff's "[fire] chief and his department acted solely in the discharge of
their duties as firewards"); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 179,
369 A.2d 49, 54-55 (Law Div. 1976) (holding that "a municipal corporation may not
recover as damages the costs of its governmental operations which it was created to per-
form"); State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 129 Misc. 2d 371, 373, 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257
(Nassau County Ct. 1985) (denying state government recovery of costs of diverting traffic
from vicinity of fallen power lines: "[t]he plaintiff may not recover damages for undertak-
ing its duty to ensure the safety of the travelling public"); see also Allenton Volunteer
Fire Dep't v. Soo Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (denying recovery to
volunteer fire department of costs incurred in extinguishing fires because the town had a
contract with plaintiff to provide fire protection, and therefore "plaintiff was doing no
more than discharging its contractual obligation to the town"). But see United States v.
American Oil Co., 417 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1969) (maritime action rejecting the preex-
isting duty defense and allowing recovery of salvage-type award for expenses incurred by
U.S. Navy and Air Force in assisting U.S. Coast Guard's firefighting efforts on defend-
ant's ship), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970).
46. See supra note 45.
47. 146 N.J. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (Law Div. 1976).
48. See id. at 179-80, 369 A.2d at 54-55. The court determined that the city could not
recover its fire prevention and extinguishment costs because "[t]hat is the very purpose of
government for which it was created." Id. at 179, 369 A.2d at 55.
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cleanup costs incurred by a municipality in response to an oil spill.4 9
Noting first that a private party would have been liable on a theory of
strict liability for the operation of an ultra-hazardous activity, 50 the court
held that fire suppression efforts "remain[ ] an area where the people as a
whole absorb the cost" 51 despite the existence of user charges for certain
other government services.52
49. The spill originated from tanks located on defendants' property. See id. at 171,
369 A.2d at 50. In responding to the spill, the Bridgeton fire department was required to
be at the site for one week. See id. In the process, the City expended money for extensive
overtime work and had to purchase special chemicals and equipment. See id. The City
sought reimbursement for these response costs from both the owner and lessee of the
property on which the spill occurred. See id.
50. See id. at 177, 369 A.2d at 53-54. The court held that "this is the proper time to
extend the concept of strict liability in this state to those who store ultra-hazardous or
pollutant substances. This means that a defendant becomes liable for damages caused to
a proper plaintiff." Id. Nonetheless, the court determined that in this case the govern-
ment was not a "proper plaintiff" and denied recovery. See id. at 178-79, 369 A.2d at 54-
55.
51. Id. at 179, 369 A.2d at 54. In support, the court analogized to police protection
services, noting that "[n]o one expects the rendering of a bill (other than a tax bill) if a
policeman apprehends a thief." Id. The court went on to conclude that firefighting serv-
ices fall "within this ambit" and therefore "may not be billed as a public utility." Id.
52. See id. at 178-79, 369 A.2d at 54. The government services listed by the court as
examples of areas where revenue had been derived were turnpikes, water or power supply
and postal services. See id.
The concept of user charges or fees for government services is not a novel one. See
National Comm'n on Urban Problems, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Impact of the Property Tax:
Its Economic Implications for Urban Problems, 39-40 (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter
Impact of the Property Tax] (discussing the implementation by local governments of user
charges for public services to increase general revenue funds). In fact, user charges, in
the past, have comprised a significant source of general revenue for cities and other local
governments. See Oakland, Central Cities: Fiscal Plight and Prospects for Reform, in Cur-
rent Issues in Urban Economics 341 (P. Mieszkowski & M. Straszheim eds. 1979); Im-
pact of the Property Tax, supra, at 39.
The virtues of the imposition of user charges for governmental services have been de-
scribed as follows:
Besides raising revenue, user charges are considered outstanding fiscal devices
because they can promote fairness, ration scarce resources, and contribute to
economic efficiency. Their most immediate appeal is equity-those who receive
public benefits pay for them and pay according to the degree of benefits ob-
tained. Those who derive no benefits are not forced to subsidize beneficiaries.
Rybeck, supra note 32, at 145. The attractiveness of user charges for government services
has been receiving increased attention. See, e.g., President's Private Sector Survey on
Cost Control Report on User Charges, 5-16, 181-83 (1983) (discussing the revenue-en-
hancing benefits for the federal government of the imposition of user fees for such activi-
ties as Coast Guard search and rescue services in "non-life threatening" emergencies
involving recreational boat owners running out of gas offshore); Moak, The Revenue
Source With Vitality--A New Look at Some Ancient Concepts--Non-Tax Revenues, in
Cities Under Stress 475-92 (R. Burchell & D. Listokin eds. 1981) (discussing potential for
expansion of the use of non-tax sources of revenue such as user charges to ease financial
pressures on local governments); see also Impact of the Property Tax, supra, at 39
("[T]here is considerable potential for greater exploitation of user-charges, in connection
with activities which do not have significant income-redistribution objectives.") (emphasis
in original); cf A.B.A.J., Mar. 1, 1987 at 30 (reporting Congress' recent decision to raise
the fees for filing civil and bankruptcy actions; Sen. Warren Rudman commented on the
decision: "It was a question of having to shut down some of the activities of the judiciary
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This rationale does not address the issue of overlapping or intersecting
duties. Although government may have an obligation to provide for the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens,53 citizens also have a duty not to
act negligently or recklessly and thereby cause harm to others.5 It can
be argued that one who creates an emergency situation has an affirmative
duty both to aid the victims and to minimize damages," and if the gov-
ernment responds to the emergency, it assumes the tortfeasor's duty.56
A related point is that the government's undertaking to respond to an
emergency does not mean necessarily that it also is obligated to subsidize
or indemnify the tortfeasor who negligently created the emergency in the
first place. Finally, there is no reason why a municipality's financial
interests should not be entitled to legal protection, particularly since it is
suing on behalf of its taxpayers to whom the money ultimately belongs.5"
B. Settled Expectations
In City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway,59 involv-
ing the derailment of railroad tank cars carrying liquified gas," the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied recovery to a municipality for
or raising the filing fees. We finally decided we ought to have more user fees and people
ought to pay for the use of the system. .. ").
In the disaster response cost context in particular, the phrase "user charge," see Note,
Government Recovery of Emergency Service Expenditures: An Analysis of User Charges,
19 Loyola L.A.L. Rev. 971, 972 n.8 (1986) [hereinafter User Charges], is somewhat im-
precise. It would make little sense to impose user charges on the innocent victims of
disasters, see Rybeck, supra note 32, at 138, who might be said to be the true users of such
emergency services as rescue operations and evacuations. On the other hand, tortfeasors
causing disasters would be considered users of the emergency services if they or their
property were being saved. Semantics aside, it does not offend principles of equity to
charge the tortfeasor, as opposed to an innocent victim, for the use or provision of the
emergency services as long as such services are required as a result of the tortfeasors
actions.
53. See U.S. Const. preamble (function of government is to "promote the general
welfare"); see also Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R, 653 F.2d 1123, 1127-32 (7th Cir.
1980) (local government obligated to provide for health, safety and welfare of its citizens),
cerL denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 NJ. Super. 169,
178-79, 369 A.2d 49, 54-55 (Law Div. 1976) (same).
54. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
57. See discussion of user charges supra note 52. It should also be noted that public
safety services can be contracted out to private parties. See International City Manage-
ment Ass'n, 1983 Municipal Yearbook 199-217; America Burning, supra note 12, at 23;
cf President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, Report on Privatization 1-7 (1983)
(discussing the fiscal benefits to the government of privatization of certain governmental
services). In fact, many of the early fire companies in the United States were incorpo-
rated and provided service on a contract basis. See America Burning, supra note 12, at
23. Thus, charging for emergency response services is appropriate because such services
appear to be more akin to a proprietary, as opposed to a governmental function.
58. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
59. 719 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1983).
60. See id at 323. The four derailed railroad cars were operated by the named de-
fendant. See id
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emergency evacuation costs.6 Applying the rule set forth in City of
Bridgeton,62 the City of Flagstaff court observed that the imposition of
liability would disrupt the "settled expectations" of businesses and indi-
viduals.63 According to the City of Flagstaff court, society's "settled ex-
pectations" mandate that the cost of emergency services be spread by
taxes, and that the government provide the response services free of
charge to negligent tortfeasors. 64 Although acknowledging that in some
instances the disruption of such expectations is justified,6" the court con-
cluded that tortfeasor liability for disaster response costs would not be
imposed because the existing system of taxpayer subsidies was neither
"irrational nor unfair."66
There are a number of counter-arguments, equally grounded in consid-
erations of policy, that can be made against the settled expectations ra-
61. See id. To protect the public from the danger of leakage or explosion, plaintiff's
fire department ordered that all persons within a certain distance from the scene of the
derailment be evacuated. The expense to the city for the evacuation, including overtime
wages, emergency equipment, emergency medical personnel, and food provided to evacu-
ated residents, was $41,954.81. See id.
62. 146 N.J. Super. 169, 178-80, 369 A.2d 49, 54-55 (Law Div. 1976).
63. City of Flagstaff, 719 F.2d at 323. The court noted that "[e]xpectations of both
business entities and individuals, as well as their insurers, would be upset substantially
were we to adopt the rule proposed by the city." Id.
64. See id. In denying recovery, the court reasoned that because a "fair and sensible
system for spreading the costs of an accident [was] already in place," the argument for
the imposition of the new liability was "not so compelling" as to justify disrupting settled
expectations. See id. The court noted a number of exceptions to the rule against common
law liability. See id. at 324. Oddly, the court concluded that "[t]hese [exception] cases
fall into distinct, well-defined categories unrelated to the normal provision of police, fire,
and emergency services, and none are applicable here." Id. at 324. If the court meant
that emergency services were not involved in any of the cases it cited, it was clearly
incorrect; at least one of the cases it cited involved a fire-undeniably an emergency
situation. However, if the court meant that liability cannot be imposed for the "normal"
as opposed to "abnormal" or extraordinary use of the services, then it should have ruled
in favor of liability, since plaintiff in City of Flagstaff was seeking to recover the expenses
incurred during the excessive, as opposed to the normal, use of its fire department.
65. See id. at 323. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed that
[s]ettled expectations sometimes must be disregarded where new tort doctrines
are required to cure an unjust allocation of risks and costs. The argument for
the imposition of the new liability is not so compelling, however, where a fair
and sensible system for spreading the costs of an accident is already in place,
even if the alternate scheme proposed might be a more precise one.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
66. Id.; see also District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1984). In Air Florida, the court rejected liability for disaster response costs, observing
that
[w]here emergency services are provided by the government and the costs are
spread by taxes, the tortfeasor does not anticipate a demand for reimbursement.
Although settled expectations must sometimes be disregarded when new tort
doctrines are needed to remedy an inequitable allocation of risks and costs,
where a generally fair system for spreading the costs of accidents is already in
effect... we do not find the argument for judicial adjustment of liabilities to be
compelling.
Id. (emphasis added).
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tionale. Although the traditional rule of non-liability for emergency
response costs may have served well in an earlier era when disasters were
on a much smaller scale, the rule is not well-suited to modem society.67
The increasing severity, frequency and complexity of modem disasters6
has led to unpredictable, and often extraordinary outlays of local tax dol-
lars69 at a time when local budgets are particularly tight. 0
Inequities arise from application of the traditional rule, given the
trans-jurisdictional nature of modem disasters, particularly transporta-
tion-related disasters71 such as airline crashes72 and railroad accidents. 71
67. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
69. See supra notes 23 & 33 and accompanying text; cf Brown, Disaster Preparedness
and the United Nations: Advance Planning for Disaster Relief 6 (1979) ("It is difficult to
predict precisely where and when a man-made disaster will occur, and therefore, it is
more difficult [than in the case of natural disasters] to prepare for one.").
An alternative to the imposition of tort liability for disaster response costs is that of
increasing property taxes. This alternative is not practical, however, in view of the tre-
mendous political volatility of increasing property taxes. See Netzer, Does the Property
Tax Have a Future?, in The Property Tax and Local Finance 231 (C. Harriss ed. 1983);
D. Paul, The Politics of the Property Tax 1 (1975). In addition, local politicians would
be reluctant to impose special assessments on industries in their jurisdiction for fear of
driving industry away. Other financial arrangements do not offer much better hope for
success. See Settle, supra note 23, at 101 (examining various alternative financing devices
such as mutual aid compacts, joint powers agreements, various types of bonds, insurance
programs, tax anticipation notes, and budget transfers, and concluding that "[i]t is diffi-
cult to earmark these revenue sources for emergency purposes when so many other de-
mands are made on community leaders for these funds"). In any case, use of any of these
alternative financing devices would thwart the policy of holding tortfeasors responsible
for the damage they inflict on society.
70. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
71. See America Burning, supra note 12, at 85-91 (discussing the growth of modern
transportation-created fire hazards).
72. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (airline crash requiring expenditure of over $750,000 in emergency response serv-
ices). During the period 1981-1983 there were 39 catastrophic air transportation acci-
dents (defined as those in which five or more persons are killed) in the United States
alone, resulting in the death of a total of 520 persons. See 1986 Bureau of the Census
Statistics, supra note 11, at 78 (Chart No. 121).
73. See e.g., City of Flagstaff'v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th
Cir. 1983) (derailment of railroad tank cars containing dangerous substance required
evacuation of all persons within one mile of accident site); Town of East Troy v. Soo Line
R.R., 653 F.2d 1123, 1125-26 (7th Cir. 1980) (action arising out of a railroad tank car
spill), cert denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); see also People Express Airlines v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 249, 495 A.2d 107, 108 (1985) (private action for economic
damages arising from evacuation following tank car accident).
In 1984 there were 1,247 persons killed and 38,570 injured in railroad accidents in the
United States. See 1986 Bureau of the Census Statistics, supra note 11, at 613 (Chart No.
1077). In addition, a U.S. EPA study reports that in the United States during the period
Aug. 1964-Feb. 1973, there were 95 railroad accidents requiring evacuations of up to
10,000 persons. See J. Hans & T. Sell, Evacuation Risks-An Evaluation 104-09 (1974).
The same study also reports four major chlorine transport barge incidents during the
period Mar. 1961-Jan. 1973, one of which required the evacuation of 150,000 persons.
See id. at 103; see also Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 194 (1967)
(2,200,000 pounds of liquid chlorine in sunken barge).
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The rule that the cost of response services be spread among the popula-
tion "as a whole" 4 breaks down where the relatively small population of
taxpayers in a disaster "host" jurisdiction is left with the bill for disaster
response and emergency cleanup services."5 The unfortunate disaster
"host" population thus bears more than its fair share of the risks, but
does not receive an equivalent share of the tax monies and other benefits
flowing from a tortfeasor's business.76 In such cases, it is more equitable
to impose liability for response costs on responsible parties than to let the
costs fall where they may.77
In addition, while it may be argued that local governments routinely
budget for the cost of responding to home fires and the like, such budget-
ing cannot take into account disasters78 which, by definition, largely are
74. City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 179, 369 A.2d 49, 54
(Law Div. 1976).
75. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1984). In Air Florida, the court summarized plaintiff's risk distribution argument as
follows:
Because the costs of emergency services occasioned by air disasters are quite
high, the city urges that considerations of economic efficiency and equity re-
quire that these costs be allocated to the airline industry and its passengers,
rather than to those distressed municipalities fortuitously located in the paths of
crashes.
Id.
A similar argument was made by plaintiffs in Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils.
Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983). In an action to recover nuclear incident emergency
evacuation costs and other damages, plaintiff argued that the costs should not be borne
solely by the municipalities immediately surrounding the nuclear power plant, but should
be spread generally across the nuclear power industry and their insurers:
[I]t defies reason to require the citizens of one state to bear the risk of substan-
tial damage to their public treasuries as a result of a nuclear accident when
there would be no risk of a nuclear accident at all but for a decision by the
citizens of all the states to undertake, in the national interest, the development
of a private nuclear power industry.
Brief of Appellant at 14-15, Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d
Cir. 1983) (No. 82-3421) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
76. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text; cf. Chavez v. Southern Pac.
Transp. Co., 413 F. Supp. 1203 (E.D. Cal. 1976). In Chavez, an action was brought by
private plaintiffs for personal injuries and property damage resulting from the explosion
of bomb loaded boxcars in defendant's railroad yard. See id. at 1205. The court held
defendant common carrier strictly liable for the conduct of an ultrahazardous activity,
reasoning that "[t]hose which benefit from the dangerous activity bear the inherent costs.
The harsh impact of inevitable disasters is softened by spreading the cost among a greater
population and over a larger time period. A more efficient allocation of resources re-
sults." Id. at 1214; see also Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774,
785, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128, 137 (1967) (holding a rocket-testing company strictly liable for
damages resulting from its activities on the ground that defendant was in the best position
to "administer the loss so that it will ultimately be borne by the public"); Note, Common
Carriers and Risk Distribution: Absolute Liability for Transporting Hazardous Materials,
67 Ky. L.J. 441, 450-55 (1978-79) [hereinafter Common Carriers] (arguing for the imposi-
tion of strict liability of common carriers of hazardous materials on the basis of a risk
distribution rationale).
78. See R. Perry, supra note 10, at 9-10.
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unanticipated.79 A cost allocation system allowing for recovery of ex-
traordinary costs from the negligent tortfeasor thus would achieve not
only a "more precise ')e ° result, but a more "fair and sensible""1 one as
well. 82
At the root of arguments in favor of liability are principles of equitable
cost allocation and risk distribution.8 3 The theory of economic efficiency
in law argues that tortfeasors, industry in particular, can better spread
the risk of loss to the general public through increased prices or insur-
ance coverage than can a system that permits the costs of accidents to be
borne by the party directly harmed 84 Following this reasoning,
tortfeasor liability for the cost of disaster response services would more
accurately reflect the true cost of accidents than does the present system
of localized taxpayer subsidies.
C. No Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss
Another argument against the imposition of tortfeasor liability for
emergency response costs is based on the rule that economic loss, in the
absence of physical harm, generally is not recoverable in tort." This de-
79. See B. Brown, supra note 69, at 6.
80. City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323-24 (9th Cir.
1983).
81. District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
82. A defendant may argue that because a particular jurisdiction has allowed, or even
encouraged, a particular activity or business to be carried on within its borders, the risk
of disaster has essentially been assumed. However, while a local government may en-
courage certain businesses to be carried on within its borders, it is reasonable for the local
residents to expect that those businesses will be responsible and not negligent.
83. See generally G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic
Analysis (1970) [hereinafter Calabresi I] (classic work on theory of risk distribution and
equitable cost allocation); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter Calabresi II] (application of risk distribution
theories to the law of torts); Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960)
(development of the "Coase Theorem" of internalization of social costs).
For a short history of the growth of literature in the field of economic analysis of law,
from which the risk distribution theory derives, see R. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 19-20 (3d ed. 1986).
84. See Calabresi I, supra note 83, at 39-67; see also People Express Airlines v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 255, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985) (noting that the funda-
mental policies of tort law are served by the shifting of risk of loss and associated costs of
dangerous activities to those best able to bear them). The theory seeks to internalize the
social costs of doing business because, as Professor Calabresi points out, "[n]ot charging
an enterprise with a cost which arises from it leads to an understatement of the true cost
of producing its goods. . . ." Calabresi II, supra note 83, at 514.
85. See In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 856-58 (M.D. Pa.
1982) (plaintiff's claim for civil defense expenses and excessive government employee's
wages are pure economic losses, not compensable without personal injury or property
damage, neither of which plaintiff had alleged), aff'd in part, vacated, and remanded in
part sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983).
But see People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 NJ. 246, 251-60, 263,
495 A.2d 107, 109-14, 116 (1985) (allowing recovery of economic losses suffered during
an emergency and discussing at length the history of the rule in tort regarding economic
loss).
1987] 1015
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
fense is sometimes based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C,
which denies tort liability for pure economic losses. s6 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts rule, however, does allow for recovery when the eco-
nomic loss is sustained in connection with physical damage to the person,
land or chattels of plaintiff.8 7 Under this exception, "economic losses"
such as disaster response costs can be recovered as "parasitic damages"
when, for example, the government's own property has been damaged 8
or threatened with damage.89
In addition to "parasitic loss" cases, courts have allowed recovery of
economic loss in tort, despite the absence of any physical harm to plain-
tiff.90 For example, in People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail
Corp.,91 plaintiff brought an action to recover lost sales and profits result-
ing from defendant's negligently caused disaster.92 The court held that
one owes a duty of care to take reasonable measures to avoid the risk of
causing economic harm to others, despite the absence of physical injury
to plaintiff.93 The court carefully limited this liability to those plaintiffs
86. The rule reads that "[olne is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not deriving
from physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor's negligently...
interfering with the other's performance of his contract or making the performance more
expensive or burdensome. . . ." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979). The rule
is limited to interference with contractual relations; consequently, its application to re-
sponse cost recovery actions is tenuous. The trial court in In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities
Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853 (M.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated, and remanded in part
sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983), based
its holding in part on this rule, thus incorrectly characterizing plaintiff's claims for civil
defense efforts as "non-parasitic economic loss[es]" within the meaning of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 766C (1979). See 544 F. Supp. at 856; cf Dunlop Tire & Rub-
ber Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150, 153-54, 385 N.Y.S.2d 971, 973-74 (4th Dep't
1976) (in awarding plaintiff recovery of economic losses sustained as a result of an explo-
sion of defendant's factory, the court rejected the contention that the tort was negligent
interference with contract, noting instead that "[p]laintiff's rights arise from an in-
dependent duty of care owed to it by defendant").
87. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766C comment b at 25 (1979). The Restate-
ment refers to such losses as "'parasitic' compensatory damages." Id.
88. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
89. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 1974) (in an action
for damages to commercial fishermen resulting from oil spill, recognizing duty not to
negligently cause economic losses); People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
100 N.J. 246, 267, 495 A.2d 107, 118 (1985) (allowing recovery at common law for eco-
nomic losses suffered as a result of chemical emergency in absence of physical harm to
plaintiff); Dunlop Tire and Rubber Corp. v. FMC Corp., 53 A.D.2d 150, 153-54, 385
N.Y.S.2d 971, 974 (4th Dep't 1976) (recovery in negligence for economic losses sustained
by private plaintiff as a result of chemical plant explosion).
91. 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107 (1985).
92. See id. at 249-50, 495 A.2d at 108-09 (1985). The action arose out of a fire that
began in defendant Consolidated Rail Corporation's freight yard due to the escape of a
flammable chemical from a tank car that had been punctured during a coupling opera-
tion. See id. at 249, 495 A.2d at 108. As a result of the fire, an evacuation within a one-
mile radius of the site was ordered, which included the operations base of plaintiff. See
id. The damage alleged by plaintiff consisted of the business-interruption losses incurred
during the twelve hours of the evacuation event. See id. at 249-50, 495 A.2d at 108-09.
93. See id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116.
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comprising an identifiable class whom the defendant knew or had reason
to know were likely to suffer damages from its negligent conduct.94 In
holding for plaintiff, the court observed that "[t]he more particular is the
foreseeability that economic loss will be suffered by the plaintiff as a re-
sult of defendant's negligence, the more just is it that liability be imposed
and recovery allowed.""5
Finally, prospects for recovery of economic loss in tort, even in the
absence of "physical harm" as currently defined, are improving, as recent
criticism 96 has been directed at the strained distinctions made between
94. See id. The court stressed that what it meant by an identifiable class of plaintiffs
was not simply a foreseeable class of plaintiffs. See id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116. It ex-
plained that "[ain identifiable class of plaintiffs must be particularly foreseeable in terms
of the type of persons or entities comprising the class, the certainty or predictability of
their presence, the approximate numbers of those in the class, as well as the type of
economic expectations disrupted." Id. at 264, 495 A.2d at 116.
95. Id. at 263, 495 A.2d at 116; accord Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568-69
(9th Cir. 1974) (applying foreseeability principles in an action to recover damages for
economic losses incurred in wake of oil spill).
In addressing the issue of recovery in tort of pure economic losses, an analogy can be
made to the increased willingness of some courts to abrogate the requirement of physical
harm in order to allow recovery for mental distress. See Hagerty v. L & L Marine Servs.,
Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986) (reversing summary judgment for defendant on
claim based on fear of cancer despite absence of physical harm). The policies behind the
physical harm requirement for recovery of mental distress damages, the prevention of
feigned claims and protection against unforeseeable risks and unlimited liability, see Pros-
ser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 54, at 360-61, mirror those behind the physical harm
requirement for recovery of economic losses in tort. As to the feigned claim policy, the
argument against imposition of liability for economic loss is weak since the expenditure of
money is a difficult claim to feign, as opposed to mental distress injuries, which are diffi-
cult to verify. See Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss A Reas-
sessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513, 1524-25 (1985). Although the unlimited liability issue is
perhaps the most critical concern, see id. at 1526 ("The common thread running through
the limitations on recovery for emotional distress, consortium, and economic loss is not
difficult to identify.... [I]t is an age-old concern about extending liability ad infinitum
for the consequences of a negligent act."), checks on such liability are available to the
courts. See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 NJ. 246, 264, 495
A.2d 107, 116 (1985) (applying foreseeability principles to a tort claim for economic loss
damages); cf Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 173, 404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979) (applying foresee-
ability principles in action seeking recovery of damages for mental distress where plaintiff
was outside zone of physical danger). For other discussions of the issue of tort liability
for economic loss see Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy: The Case
for Recovery, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 664 (1964); Comment, Foreseeability of Third-Party Eco-
nomic Injuries-A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 283 (1953).
96. See City of Manchester v. National Gypsum Co., 637 F. Supp. 646, 649-50
(D.R.I. 1986). In City of Manchester, an action was brought to recover the cost of abating
asbestos in buildings. See id at 649. The court, in holding that the plaintiffs' injury was
properly characterized as physical harm as opposed to economic harm, observed that
it is at best, somewhat artificial to try to characterize the damage plaintiff claims
as either one or the other, as either physical damage to its property or economic
damage. Such pigeon holes may have been useful when tort and contract suits
were less complex, but today ... the reasons for such divisions are less clear and
the ability to make such distinctions is questionable.
Id. at 649-50. The court also observed that "[t]he limitations of the Restatement [(Sec-
ond) of Torts] definition [of physical harm] are particularly apparent when one realizes
that the problem of characterizing highly toxic substances and the damage they cause is
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"physical harm" injuries, where recovery generally is allowed, and "eco-
nomic loss" injuries, where recovery in tort generally is denied.
D. Unlimited Liability
An objection to the expansion of new areas of tort liability in general is
that it will lead to unlimited or widespread liability.97 This argument is
two-fold. First is the "floodgates" argument that the courts will be over-
come with litigation if a new area of tort liability is recognized.98 Second
is the fear of liability for damages disproportionate to defendant's fault.9 9
There are a number of points to consider in addressing these concerns.
First, liability for disaster response costs would be only for extraordinary
or excessive costs. 100 Common every-day accidents would not trigger lia-
bility because such accidents are within the zone of risk anticipated by
response services.10 1 For instance, although residential fires and car acci-
dents are encompassed by this zone of risk, accidents of disaster propor-
tions such as major airline crashes, railroad derailments, toxic waste
spills and similar emergencies are not. 102
A second answer to the unlimited liability argument is that courts can
apply, and juries can be instructed on, foreseeability principles to keep
liability within reasonable bounds. 103 In addition, courts always have re-
quired that any disaster response costs awarded be "necessary and
of relatively recent origin. Tort law and its definitions are of a constantly evolving na-
ture." Id. at 650.
97. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974); R. Rabin, supra
note 95, at 1513-38.
98. Cf. Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 162, 404 A.2d 672, 680 (1979) (in bystander mental
distress action noting floodgates defense). For a classic rebuttal of the floodgates defense
see Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 755 n.3, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77 n.3
(1968) ("we point out that courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits,
whether there be few suits or many; the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows
society's pressing need for legal redress."); see also Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 162-63, 404
A.2d 672, 680-81 (1979).
99. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 825 n.8 (2d Cir. 1968) (giving the
example that a negligent driver who causes an accident in the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel
during rush hour could conceivably be responsible for astronomical economic losses).
100. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
101. This only seems proper since tortfeasors pay taxes and therefore would be entitled
to at least some use of emergency services free of charge.
102. Also, as a practical matter it would not be cost-effective for a government entity
to entangle itself in an expensive lawsuit for the relatively small costs incurred in respond-
ing to minor emergencies such as car crashes and small home fires that are not properly
characterized as disasters. However, there can be exceptions. See Department of Natu-
ral Resources v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 108 Wis. 2d 403, 404, 321 N.W.2d 286,
287 (1982) ($63.60 in fire suppression costs sought).
103. See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 254, 495
A.2d 107, 111 (1985). In allowing a private party to recover for economic losses sus-
tained as a result of a negligently caused fire, the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
the unlimited liability argument as follows: "The answer to the allegation of unchecked
liability is not the judicial obstruction of a fairly grounded claim for redress. Rather, it
must be a more sedulous application of traditional concepts of duty and proximate causa-
tion to the facts of each case." Id. (citation omitted); see also Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
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reasonable.""o
A third way to limit liability is the use of applicable tort or contract
statutes of limitations to bar stale claims for recovery of emergency re-
spouse costs. 105 Finally, if liability were imposed through statutory au-
thority, a clause fixing limitations on liability could be included in the
statute's provisions.
II. COMMON LAW THEORIES OF RECOVERY
Various exceptions to the traditional rule are used by some courts to
impose common law liability on tortfeasors for disaster response costs.'06
These include costs incurred during the abatement of a public nui-
sance107 and those incurred in the protection of the government's own
property.108 In addition, at least one court has articulated a basis of re-
covery derived from the public trust doctrine,"°9 although no court has
yet imposed liability on a negligent party under this theory. The most
appropriate legal approach in a given situation depends on the particular
facts involved. 1 This part discusses these various theories and analyzes
their relative strengths and weaknesses.
A. Negligence Theory of Recovery
Tort law traditionally has held that a plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages in negligence' I I if the defendant owed a duty of due care to the
plaintiff,1 2 if the defendant breached that duty," I3 and if the breach was
F.2d 558, 568-70 (9th Cir. 1974) (limiting liability for economic losses arising from oil
spill through use of foreseeability principles).
104. See Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R., 653 F.2d 1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. United States, 139 F.2d 632,
633 (4th Cir. 1944); People v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 593, 605, 128
Cal. Rptr. 697, 705 (1976).
105. See, e.g., United States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 1985) (six
year quasi-contract statute of limitations); People v. Wilson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 574, 578,
49 Cal. Rptr. 792, 795 (1966) (claim for fire suppression costs barred by 2-year contract
statute of limitations).
106. See supra note 35.
107. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
108. See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
109. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080-86 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
110. An action solely for the recovery of emergency response costs from negligent
tortfeasors seems to be one with little or no precedent in most jurisdictions. See District
of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1079 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (case of first
impression); City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir.
1983) (same); see also City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., - Pa. Commw. - -
512 A.2d 83, 84 (1986) (noting the "limited case law" on the issue), petition denied, 520
A.2d 1386 (1987).
111. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 (1965) (outlining the basic elements of a
negligence cause of action); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 30, at 164-65 (same).
112. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 53, at 356: "[IWn negligence cases, the
duty is always the same-to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the
light of the apparent risk." The determination by courts of the existence of a duty of care
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the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury." 4 For most negligently caused
man-made disasters, these traditional elements of tort liability can be
proved. First, in a disaster situation a duty of reasonable care is owed the
public at large which, in essence, is represented by the government plain-
tiff in a response cost recovery action." 5 In addition, the need for emer-
gency services in the event of a negligently caused disaster certainly is
proximately caused by the tortfeasor. 116
involves the weighing of numerous factors. For instance, in Vu v. Singer Co., 538 F.
Supp. 26 (N.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 706 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938
(1983), the district court stated that it
must balance the following factors when determining the existence of duty in
each particular case: (1) foreseeability of harm to plaintiff; (2) degree of cer-
tainty that plaintiff suffered injury; (3) closeness of connection between defend-
ant's conduct and injury suffered; [(4)] moral blame attached to defendant's
conduct; (5) policy of preventing future harm; (6) extent of burden to defendant
and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care
with resulting liability for breach; and (7) availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.
Vu, 538 F. Supp. at 29.
It must be determined that a "definite legal obligation" is owed, Prosser & Keeton,
supra note 40, § 53, at 357, for "[n]egligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." Pollock,
Law of Torts 468 (13th ed. 1920). A duty of care is owed if the wrongdoer could have
foreseen the harm to plaintiff resulting from his tortious act. As stated by the New York
Court of Appeals: "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed,
and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehen-
sion." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
113. Breach consists of a failure to conform to a standard of reasonable care. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965); Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 31, at
169. For an application of these traditional tort law principles to the disaster response
cost recovery situation see United States v. Andrews, 206 F. Supp. 50 (D. Idaho 1961). In
Andrews, the court imposed liability in negligence for fire suppression and restoration
costs upon finding that defendant failed to exercise due care in using acetylene torch in
dry field. See id. at 51-52.
114. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 41, at 563-64, § 42, at 272-73.
115. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (seeking recovery of the cost of "tax-supported emergency services"); City of Ev-
ansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1018 (7th Cir. 1979) (in
public nuisance abatement costs recovery action, the court noted that "[t]he plaintiffs are
municipal or public corporations, subdivisions of the state, that were required to spend
public funds because of pollution of an interstate waterway by acts done in another
state") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); In re TMI Litig. Gov't
Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 854 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (actions seeking recovery "on
behalf of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania"), aff'd in part, vacated, and remanded in
part sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983); see
also Brief of Appellant at 32 n.24, Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d
117 (3d Cir. 1983) (No. 82-3421) ("In asserting a right to recover extraordinary emer-
gency expenses, the Commonwealth is asserting the public's right to recover in strict
liability or negligence the expenses which the public reasonably incurred in the protection
of itself and its property .... ).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Morehart, 449 F.2d 1283, 1284 (9th Cir. 1971) (in al-
lowing recovery by government of expenses incurred in extinguishing fire, court acknowl-
edged jury's finding of a violation by defendants of a duty owed the United States stating,
"[o]bviously there was proximate cause"); see also Brief of Appellant at 31, Pennsylvania
v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983) (No. 82-3421) ("The Common-
wealth further submits that damage to the treasuries of state and local governments re-
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A negligence action also requires proof of injury. I" Plaintiffs assert
that the injury sustained in response cost litigation is depletion of tax
resources through the "excessive" or "extraordinary" use of governmen-
tal services."11 Although courts traditionally have held that economic
loss in the absence of physical harm generally is not recoverable in
tort,1 1 9 there are sound reasons for holding otherwise. '  In fact, the
New Jersey Supreme Court recently held that foreseeable economic loss
sustained by a private plaintiff as a consequence of a negligently caused
disaster was recoverable in tort despite the absence of physical harm.'
If one has a duty to act with due care and if in breaching this duty one
causes a disaster, then it comports with traditional tort principles"2 to
impose, rather than to deny, liability for the cost of responding to that
disaster.1 23 The expansion of the scope of negligence liability to include
disaster response costs admittedly alters the common law,124 yet the
quired to respond to a nuclear accident is likewise an indisputably foreseeable risk of the
operation of a nuclear power plant .. ").
117. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 30, at 165.
118. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 120-21 (3d Cir. 1983); City of
Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 178, 369 A.2d 49, 54 (Law Div. 1976);
cf County of Champaign v. Anthony, 33 Ill. App. 3d 466, 469, 337 N.E.2d 87, 89 (1975)
(Trapp, J., dissenting) (in criminal response cost recovery action, arguing that recovery
should be allowed because the injury sustained by the county was "the invasion of prop-
erty, i.e., its tax resources as the result of the pleaded intentional acts of the defendant"),
aff'd, 64 IM. 2d 532, 356 N.E.2d 561 (1976).
119. See In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 857 (M.D. Pa.
1982), aff'd in part, vacated, and remanded in part sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General
Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766C & comment b (1979) (no recovery for pure economic loss suffered as a result of
interference in contractual relations with third parties).
120. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of recovery of
economic loss in the absence of any physical injury).
121. See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 NJ. 246, 267, 495
A.2d 107, 118 (1985).
122. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 1, at 6-7; see also People Express Airlines
v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 255, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (1985) ("Mhe over-
arching purpose of tort law: that wronged persons should be compensated for their inju-
ries and that those responsible for the wrong should bear the cost of their tortious
conduct."). The purpose of compensatory tort damages is to restore the injured party to
the position he would have been in but for defendant's tortious conduct. See United
States v. Denver & R. G. W. R.R., 547 F.2d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir. 1977).
123. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967) ("Denial of
[recovery of response costs] would permit the result, extraordinary in our jurisprudence,
of a wrongdoer shifting responsibility for the consequences of his negligence onto his
victim."); cf Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 164, 404 A.2d 672, 681 (1979) ("When we find a
duty, breach and damage, everything has been said.") (quoting Prosser, PalsgrafRevis-
ited, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1953)).
124. Recovery of disaster response costs on a theory of negligence generally has been
denied. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
City of Flagstaif v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983); State
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256-57, 129 Misc. 2d 371, 372-73 (Nas-
sau County Ct. 1985); City of Pittsburgh v. Equitable Gas Co., - Pa. Commw. -, -,
512 A.2d 83, 84 (1986), petition denied, 520 A.2d 1386 (1987). But see United States v.
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change is neither drastic nor without compelling policy and legal reasons
supporting it. 25
Critics of the traditional rules regarding liability for disasters have
raised the issue of deterrence.1 26 According to this argument, liability for
the cost of disaster response services would encourage the exercise of
greater care on the part of potential defendants than exists under the
traditional system.1 27 Although this argument is appealing, it is of ques-
tionable merit because the cost of disaster response services probably is
minor relative to other costs such as personal injury and property dam-
age claims that typically flow from a negligently caused disaster.
1 28
B. Public Nuisance Abatement Theory of Recovery
Courts recognize that the government can recover response costs in-
Denver & R. G. W. R.R., 547 F.2d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir. 1977) (allowing recovery in
negligence for fire suppression costs expended in protecting U.S. government property);
United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 310 (4th Cir. 1942) (imposing
liability on basis of statute and in negligence for costs of fire-fighting services used to
protect national forest); United States v. Andrews, 206 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D. Idaho 1961)
(imposing liability in negligence for costs incurred in suppressing fire in national forest).
125. Courts in the past have not hesitated to alter traditional rules of tort liability
when there were strong public policy reasons to do so. See, e.g., Greenmnn v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963)
(adopting theory of strict liability for defective products on public policy grounds); Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 388-91, 111 N.E. 1050, 1052-54 (1916) (abol-
ishing privity bar to liability for defective products due to societal changes). Duty is an
evolving concept. See Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 53, at 359 ("Changing social
conditions lead constantly to the recognition of new duties. No better general statement
can be made than that the courts will find a duty where, in general, reasonable persons
would recognize it and agree that it exists.") (footnote omitted).
126. This criticism has come from courts, see People Express Airlines v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 266, 495 A.2d 107, 117 (1985) ("[A]n underlying policy of the
negligence doctrine [is that] imposition of liability should deter negligent conduct by cre-
ating incentives to minimize the risks and costs of accidents."), and commentators, see
Weinstein, supra note 11, at 42; User Charges, supra note 51, at 971-93; see also Calabresi
I, supra note 83, at 26-27; R. Posner, supra note 83, at 187;
127. See User Charges, supra note 51, at 987-88. The commentator bases his argument
for the levying of emergency service user fees primarily on a deterrence rationale. See id.
at 972-73. A major problem with this reasoning, however, is that it uses a model compar-
ing the exercise of due care by a mountain climber with and without "user charges" for
emergency rescue services. See id. at 988-91. The analogy is inapplicable to the negligent
tortfeasor emergency situation because a mountain climber is primarily concerned with
his own personal safety and not with profit margins or future economic losses. It also is
questionable at best whether anyone would take less care for their own personal safety in
the absence of liability for rescue services than they would were there to be such liability.
In contrast, in the corporate world, monetary deterrence can have real impact on the day-
to-day decisions made by businessmen acting in their companys' best economic interests.
128. Thus, imposition of liability for such costs, in all likelihood, would add little or no
additional deterrence to negligent conduct beyond that which already exists.
An additional problem with the deterrence rationale in general is raised by Judge
Weinstein: "The prospect of huge tort recoveries, of course, can be a strong factor in
inducing large responsible manufacturers to exercise care. But the threat is unlikely to
have any significant effect on thinly capitalized, 'fly by night' operators who may be re-
sponsible for a disproportionate number of disasters." Weinstein, supra note 11, at 42.
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curred during the abatement of a public nuisance.12 9 A public nuisance
is defined as an "unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."' 130 Some courts recently have expanded the concept of
public nuisance to include activities interfering with aesthetic values or
natural resources. 13 ' There also is a growing recognition by federal
courts of suits by government plaintiffs under the federal common law of
nuisance.132 These trends arguably allow room for the expansion of lia-
129. See City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.
1983) (dictum); United States v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Mo.
1980); State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 493, 468 A.2d 150, 160 (1983); see also City of
Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1017-19 (7th Cir. 1979)
(allowing recovery of toxic chemical spill abatement costs under federal common law of
nuisance), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
In addition to liability at common law, a party also may be liable for nuisance abate-
ment costs pursuant to statute. See, e.g., Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R., 653 F.2d
1123, 1132 (7th Cir. 1980) (allowing recovery of groundwater pollution abatement costs
pursuant to Wisconsin nuisance statute), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); Brandon
Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 183-84, 263 N.W.2d 326, 328
(1977) (in action to recover costs incurred in emergency repair of defendant's dam, plain-
tiff granted leave to amend its amended complaint to comply with provisions of nuisance
statute). Courts have upheld such statutes as "legitimate exercise[s] of a state's police
power." See Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447, 461,
419 A.2d 1151, 1158 (Law Div. 1980) (citing Askew v. American Waterways Operations,
Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973)).
The existence of such public nuisance abatement statutes raises questions of preemp-
tion of common law nuisance. See State ex reL Dresser Indus. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789,
793 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (holding that statute does not preempt common law); State v.
Arlington Warehouse, 203 N.J. Super. 9, 14, 495 A.2d 882, 885 (App. Div. 1985) (liabil-
ity both at common law and under statute); Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources,
Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447, 461,419 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Law Div. 1980) (statutory remedies
are in addition to those recognized at common law); cf United States v. Oswego Barge
Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 339-44 (2d Cir. 1981) (in admiralty action seeking recovery of oil
spill cleanup costs, the court held that § 1321(f) of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., preempted maritime nuisance tort theory of recovery as
well as other common law and statutory remedies for cleanup costs).
130. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(l) (1979). Commentators note that a pub-
lic nuisance "is an entirely different concept from that of a private nuisance. It is a much
broader term and encompasses much conduct other than the type that interferes with the
use and enjoyment of private property." Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 90, at 643.
The term "public nuisance," therefore, applies to a wide variety of situations involving
community interests of public convenience. See id.
131. See, eg., State ex reL Dresser Indus. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 793 (Mo. 1980)
(en banc) (noting "growing tendency 'to treat significant interferences with recognized
aesthetic values or established principles of conservation of natural resources as amount-
ing to a public nuisance.' ") (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B comment
e at 91 (1979)); see also State v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971) (recognizing
the "ecological rights" of a state pursuant to federal common law).
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), in an opinion written by
Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court held that a state has a right to sue in its quasi-sover-
eign capacity for injuries such as public nuisances because "[i]n that capacity the State
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of
their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air." L. at 237.
132. See United States v. Illinois Terminal R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18, 21 (F-D. Mo. 1980);
see also Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907) (enjoining foreign state
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bility for public nuisance abatement to encompass a greater number and
type of disaster situations than previously recognized.
A major argument against the use of the public nuisance theory of
recovery is that the theory encompasses only recurring or continuous ac-
tivities and does not apply to sudden, one-time events. 133 Although a par-
ticular disaster may in fact be a one-time event, there are many forms of
disaster, such as oil spills, that if allowed to proceed unabated would
present a significant threat to the public and therefore satisfy the require-
ment in a public nuisance cause of action of significant harm. 34 More-
over, the conceptual distinction made in the past between situations such
as hazardous waste dumpsite cleanup operations, in which recovery at
common law is recognized, 13" and toxic chemical spills, in which recov-
ery at common law is denied,' 36 is difficult to justify or understand.
corporations from discharging air pollution over state territory under federal common
law of nuisance); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008,
1019 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing cause of action under federal common law of nuisance
for recovery of costs incurred due to defendant's discharges of toxic chemicals into drink-
ing water supply), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980). But see Pennsylvania v. General
Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1983) (refusing to adopt federal common
law theory of nuisance as basis for recovery of response costs).
This federal common law doctrine is limited to pollution with interstate effects. See
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S.
304 (1981); City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1018
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d
492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975). The federal remedy is available, however, not only to the fed-
eral government, but to states, townships and other local governmental bodies as well.
See Township of Long Beach v. City of New York, 445 F. Supp. 1203, 1213-14 (D.N.J.
1978).
Equitable remedies as well as damages are recoverable under the federal common law
of nuisance. See City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008,
1019 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980); United States v. Illinois Termi-
nal R.R., 501 F. Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
133. See State v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067-69 (D. Md. 1972);
State v. Long Island Lighting Co., 129 Misc. 2d 371, 375, 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 258-59
(Nassau County Ct. 1985); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F comment g at
107 (1979) ("It is often said by the courts and commentators that in order to constitute a
nuisance the interference must continue or recur over some period of time.").
134. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821B(2)(c) (1979) ("Circumstances that
may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include...
whether the conduct is of a continuing nature or has produced a permanent or long-
lasting effect .... ) (emphasis added); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F
comment g, at 108 (1979):
The decisions do not, however, support a categoric requirement of continu-
ance or recurrence in all cases as an established rule of law. If the defendant's
interference with the public right or with the use and enjoyment of land causes
significant harm and his conduct is otherwise sufficient to subject him to liabil-
ity for a nuisance, liability will result, however brief in duration the interference
or the harm may be.
Id.
135. See, e.g., State v. Arlington Warehouse, 203 N.J. Super. 9, 14-15, 495 A.2d 882,
885 (App. Div. 1985) (recognizing substantive liability at common law and pursuant to
statutory authority for cost of cleanup of chemical products discharged in fire).
136. See, e.g., City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th
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C. Theory of Recovery Based on Protection of Government's Own
Property
The courts have applied another exception to the rule of non-liability
for disaster response costs when disasters place government property at
risk.'3 7 The principal rationale for this exception is that the government
as an owner of property should be treated no differently than a private
owner of property.13
8
A closely related situation exists when harm to government property
has not actually been sustained but merely threatened. In United States
v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway,'39 the government brought an action to
recover the cost of suppressing a negligently caused fire that threatened a
national forest."4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deter-
mined that plaintiff was entitled to relief both under a statute 4 ' and in
tort 4 2 for the fire suppression costs. The tort theory of recovery was
based on the principle that one "whose legally protected interests [are]
endangered by the tortious conduct of another is entitled to recover"
damages for a reasonable effort to avert the threatened harm.'43 Courts
could expand use of the government property exception because of the
Cir. 1983) (denying recovery at common law for costs incurred in response to emergency
created by derailment of four railroad tank cars containing liquified gas).
137. See United States v. Denver and R G. W. RR., 547 F.2d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Morehart, 449 F.2d 1283, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Andrews, 206 F. Supp. 50, 52 (D. Idaho 1961); see also United States v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 310 (4th Cir. 1942) (holding defendant liable pursuant to both state
statutory authority and common law for expenses reasonably incurred to protect govern-
ment property). The principle also has been recognized in dicta in numerous cases. See
District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984); City of
Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1983); In re TMI
Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 855 (M.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd in part, va-
cated, and remanded in part sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710
F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983); People v. Wilson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576, 49 Cal. Rptr. 792,
794 (1966).
138. See United States v. Denver and R. G. W. RB.., 547 F.2d 1101, 1104 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Boone, 476 F.2d 276, 278 (10th Cir. 1973); Department of
Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447,461, 419 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Law Div.
1980); see also Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 2, at 7 (state as the owner of property
"may resort to the same tort actions as any individual proprietor to recover for injuries to
the property, or to recover the property itself.") (footnotes omitted); cf State v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 129 Misc. 2d 371, 373-74, 493 N.Y.S.2d 255, 257 (Nassau County
Ct. 1985) (rejecting plaintiff's contention that it was acting as a landowner and thus was
entitled to recovery of emergency response costs in diverting traffic from parkway in
vicinity of fallen power lines).
139. 130 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1942).
140. See id at 309. The fire had burned over 560 acres of privately owned land and
had come within 2,500 feet of the national forest. See id.
141. See id. at 309-10. The statute provided that one who negligently sets a fire is
liable for all expenses incurred in fighting the fire. See id. at 310.
142. See iL at 310.
143. Id The court stated:
Aside from the question of recovery under the statute we are of the opinion
that the plaintiff was entitled to relief in tort.
'A person whose legally protected interests have been endangered by the tor-
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likelihood of harm to government property in some disaster situations if
no action is taken.144
D. Public Trust Doctrine Theory of Recovery
One federal court of appeals recently considered the public trust doc-
trine as a basis for recovery of disaster response costs.145 The doctrine
derives from the fact that waterways and certain other public properties
are held in trust by the sovereign for the benefit of the public.' 46 Trust
responsibilities are vested in the sovereign states147 and typically involve
the protection of certain public uses such as navigation, commerce and
tious conduct of another is entitled to recover for expenditures reasonably made
or harm suffered in a reasonable effort to avert the harm threatened.'
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting the Restatement of Torts § 919 (1939)) (adopted in sub-
stantially the same form in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 919 (1979)). The legally
protected interest in Chesapeake was the government's own real property. See id. at 310.
The court in Chesapeake also held:
Damages for personal injuries received in an attempt to save property menaced
by the negligence of another are recoverable from the wrongdoer. The principle
of liability for foreseeable consequences, upon which this rule is based, certainly
permits the recovery of damages in the form of expenditures incurred in at-
tempting to save property.
Id. (citations omitted).
144. For example, in District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1984), not only was the Potomac River in a sense harmed by the aircrash, but the govern-
ment-owned 14th Street/Rochambeau Bridge also was damaged. Id. at 1078; see also
Brief of Appellant at 32 n.24, Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117
(3d Cir. 1983) (No 82-3421) (arguing that the evacuation expenses incurred during the
Three Mile Island incident were "expenses which the public reasonably incurred in the
protection of itself and its property from the pervasive threat of harm posed by the acci-
dent at TMI").
It also can be argued that the government is entitled to recover response costs incurred
not only in protecting its own property but also in protecting its "quasi-sovereign" inter-
est that is "independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air
within its domain." Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907). The
reasoning behind allowing recovery when response costs are incurred to protect the gov-
ernment's own property is analogous to that used with the public trust theory of recov-
ery, discussed infra notes 145-64 and accompanying text.
145. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080-86 (D.C. Cir.
1984); cf State ex rel. Dresser Indus. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc) (recognizing viability of state's public nuisance damages claim of acting in its sover-
eign capacity as "'trustee for its citizens' ").
146. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); District of Columbia v. Air Fla.,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court,
33 Cal. 3d 419, 434, 658 P.2d 709, 718, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983); see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (recognizing a state's right
under the doctrine to "conserve or utilize its resources on behalf of its own citizens"); In
re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (holding that the right
arising under the public trust doctrine to protect public interests in natural resources
arises not from the ownership of the resources but "from a duty owing to the people").
The public trust doctrine is an ancient one, traceable to the Magna Carta, see Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409-410 (1842), and having its roots in ancient
Rome, see District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082 & n.17 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
147. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894); Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois,
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fishing. 148
Originally, the public trust doctrine was used to restrain a state's
power to alienate public trust lands149 and operated as a limitation on
uses interfering with trust purposes.150 More recently, courts have con-
strued a state's obligations under the doctrine to include the affirmative
duty of protecting the land and its resources against impairment.' 5 '
Since its inception, courts have expanded the interests protected by the
doctrine from simply those of navigation, commerce and fishing to in-
clude other interests such as aesthetics and the preservation of natural
resources present on public trust lands. 52 The public interests protected
146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1081
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
148. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1894); Illinois Central R.L v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 796 (1971). The court in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), de-
scribed in detail the nature of the interest of the state in public trust properties:
[T]he State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters ... within its
limits, in the same manner that the State holds title to soils under tide water, by
the common law ... and that title necessarily carries with it control over the
waters above them whenever the lands are subjected to use. But it is a title
different in character from that which the State holds in lands intended for sale.
It is different from the title which the United States hold in the public lands
which are open to preemption and sale. It is a title held in trust for the people
of the State that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on com-
merce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction
or interference of private parties.
Id at 452.
149. See Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892); District of Colum-
bia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 & n. 26 (D.C. Cir. 1984); People ex rel
Webb v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 584, 138 P. 79, 82-83 (1913).
150. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1082-83 & n.27 (D.C.
Cir. 1984); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 260, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790,
796 (1971); Flisrand v. Madsen, 35 S.D. 457, 470-71, 152 N.W. 796, 801 (1915).
151. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434-35, 658 P.2d
709, 719, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 356-57, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). In National
Audubon, suit was brought to enjoin the diversion of water from a unique natural lake in
California. Id at 424-25, 658 P.2d at 711-12, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49. In vacating a
Superior Court judgment for defendants, the California Supreme Court recognized the
public trust doctrine as providing a substantive cause of action for the protection of pub-
lic trust lands and waterways and noted that
the public trust is more than an affirmation of state power to use public prop-
erty for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect
the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, sur-
rendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the abandonment of
that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.
Id at 441, 658 P.2d at 724, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360-61; see also In re Steuart Transp. Co.,
495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (observing that under the public trust doctrine both
"the State of Virginia and the United States have the right and the duty to protect and
preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources").
152. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 796 (1971); see also Besig v. Friend, 463 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-60 (N.D. Cal. 1979)
(citing Marks for the proposition that the public trust doctrine protects additional uses
not within the traditionally protected uses of navigation, commerce and fisheries); Na-
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under the doctrine have been held to be "sufficiently flexible to encom-
pass changing public needs."' 153
The public trust doctrine received its most notable consideration as a
proposed basis for recovery of disaster response expenditures in District
of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc.I54 In Air Florida, one of defendant air-
line's jets crashed into the Potomac River, obstructing navigation of the
waterway and damaging a major bridge en route. 55 Plaintiff's theory of
recovery, based on the public trust doctrine'56 as outlined by the
court,1 57 began with the point that the District of Columbia as public
trustee is obligated to keep the Potomac River free from impediments to
navigation and from pollution and other impurities. 58 This obligation,
plaintiff argued, forms the basis of a duty of care on the part of Air Flor-
ida not to interfere with trust obligations. 5 9 A breach of this duty of
care, the negligently caused plane crash, therefore should enable the Dis-
trict of Columbia to recover its crash response costs. 160
Although ruling in favor of defendant on other grounds, 16' the court
tional Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 33 Cal. 3d 419, 434, 658 P.2d 709, 719, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 356 (observing that "the objective[s] of the public trust doctrine [have] evolved
in tandem" with changes in public values), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
153. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 796
(1971). In Marks, the court held that a patentee's title to trust lands is subject to a public
trust easement allowing the state to enter the property in furtherance of public uses, see
id. at 261, 491 P.2d 374, 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 797, and noted that an expansive rather
than a limited view of public uses or interests protected under the doctrine was appropri-
ate: "In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded classification
favoring one mode of utilization over another." Id. at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr.
at 796 (citation omitted); see also United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water
Conserv. Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 (N.D. 1976) (observing that the public trust
doctrine is playing an "expanding role in environmental law").
For further reading on the public trust doctrine see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970); Sax,
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
185 (1980); Steven, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes the Peo-
ple's Environmental Right, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 195 (1980); Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269 (1980); Note, National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 Envtl. L.
617 (1984).
154. 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also
has considered the application of the doctrine in this area. See Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670-71 & n.20 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981).
155. District of Columbia v. Air Fla. Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For
further details regarding the Air Florida disaster see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying
text.
156. See id. at 1080-81. Plaintiff's other theory of recovery was based on the doctrine
of rational cost allocation. See id. at 1079-80. For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra
notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
157. 750 F.2d at 1080-81.
158. See id. at 1080.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1081.
161. See id. at 1080. The court followed the traditional rule as set forth in City of
Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1983), that absent
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stressed that it did not reject plaintiff's public trust theory of recovery.6 2
Rather, the court reserved judgment on the viability of the theory as a
means of recovery.1 63 The Air Florida decision, therefore, left open the
possible use of the public trust doctrine as a substantive cause of action
for the recovery by a government plaintiff of disaster response costs when
public trust lands or waterways are injured or their use is impaired. At a
minimum, the decision provides useful guidelines for applying the doc-
trine as the basis of tortfeasor liability for the cost of responding to and
mitigating the effects of a disaster. 164
statutory authority, the cost of emergency response services is not recoverable from negli-
gent tortfeasors. See Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1080.
162. Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1084.
163. See iad The court was careful to state that due to the "paucity of relevant prece-
dent and the lack of pleadings referring to the doctrine," the trial court could not be
expected to "ponder sua sponte" whether the public trust doctrine provided a trustee in
plaintiff's position with a basis for recovery. See id This problem arose because plaintiff
failed to raise the issue first in the District Court. See id. An additional hurdle to over-
come was the unresolved question of whether Congress intended to delegate to the Dis-
trict of Columbia, a municipal corporation, the federal government's public trust
responsibilities for the Potomac River. See id at 1086.
164. Closely related to the public trust doctrine is the concept of parens patriae. The
concept is generally considered one of standing used to protect quasi-sovereign interests
such as health, safety and welfare of the people, interstate water rights and the general
economy of a state. See Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38, 54 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974). Literally, the
term means "parent of the country." Black's Law Dictionary 1003 (5th ed. 1979). A
parenspatriae action is appropriate when the state acts to protect a quasi-sovereign inter-
est where no individual cause of action would lie. See In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air
Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045
(1973); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980); Hawaii v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 986-97 (D. Haw. 1969), rey'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d
1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
Only the states and the federal government as sovereigns may sue under the theory.
See United States v. Pittsburg, 661 F.2d 783, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1981); In re Multidistrict
Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1045 (1973). Political subdivisions such as cities and counties may, however, bring an
action "'to vindicate such of their own proprietary interests as might be congruent with
the interests of their inhabitants.'" American Motorcyclists Ass'n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp.
923, 931 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No.
31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973)), aff'd, 714 F.2d 962
(9th Cir. 1983).
Although earlier parens patriae actions were limited to injunctions, see New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313-14 (1921); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 238-39 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901), more recently, courts
have acknowledged that damages also may be recovered. See Maine v. M/V Tamano,
357 F. Supp. 1097, 1101-02 (D. Me. 1973); Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v.
Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972); see also Hawaii v.
Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 982, 987 (D. Haw. 1969) (in antitrust action rejecting
argument that damages cannot be recovered in a parens patriae suit), rev'd on other
grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 405 U.S. 251 (1972). For further discus-
sion of parens patriae damages actions see Note, State Protection of its Economy and
Environment Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 411, 419-21
(1970).
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E. Theory of Recovery Based on Strict Liability for Abnormally
Dangerous Activities
Another theory for the recovery of disaster response costs is strict lia-
bility for abnormally dangerous activities. 6 5 In order for this theory to
apply, a plaintiff first must demonstrate that the defendant's activity is
properly classified as abnormally dangerous.' 66 Activities such as operat-
ing airlines,' 67 transporting hazardous materials or substances, 168 and
storing hazardous chemicals, 169 all high-risk sources of disasters, are
some examples of such abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous activi-
165. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977) outlines the theory:
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability
for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity,
although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which
makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
Id.
For some examples of cases that mention the application of this theory in the disaster
response context see City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323,
324 (9th Cir. 1983); Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 120 & nn.3
& 4 (3d Cir. 1983); City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 172-78, 369
A.2d 49, 51-54 (Law Div. 1976).
166. The Restatement enumerates some of the factors to be considered in determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977).
167. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520A (1977) (specifically imposing strict
liability for ground damage caused by aircraft).
In explaining the reason for this rule, comment c to § 520A at 43-44 states "[t]he
position taken is that aviation has not yet reached the stage of development where the
risks of accidental physical harm to persons or to land or chattels on the ground is prop-
erly to be borne by those who suffer the harm, rather than by the industry itself." Id.
168. See National Steel Serv. Center v. Gibbons, 693 F.2d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1982),
cert denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); Indiana Harbor Belt Ry. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
517 F. Supp. 314, 319-20 (N.D. I1. 1981); Chavez v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 413 F.
Supp. 1203, 1211 (E.D. Cal. 1976); Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 456, 502 P.2d
1181, 1186 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973). But see EAC Timberlane v.
Pisces, Ltd., 745 F.2d 715, 721-22 (Ist Cir. 1984) (holding that doctrine of strict liability
for the miscarriage of ultrahazardous goods does not apply to carrier of goods by sea due
to need for uniformity in admiralty law).
169. See City of Northglenn v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 519 F. Supp. 515, 516 (D. Colo.
1981); State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 492-93, 468 A.2d 150, 159-60 (1983); State v.
Arlington Warehouse, 203 N.J. Super. 9, 14-15, 495 A.2d 882, 885 (App. Div. 1985);
City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146 N.J. Super. 169, 177, 369 A.2d 49, 53-54 (Law
Div. 1976); see also Prosser & Keeton, supra note 40, § 78, at 549-50 (noting that the
principle that "the hazardous enterprise, even though it be socially valuable, must pay its
way, and make good the damage inflicted" has been applied to "explosives or inflamma-
ble liquids stored in quantity in the midst of a city").
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ties. In addition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury sustained
was within the general class of harm threatened by the activity. 170
Thus far, courts considering the theory have limited the imposition of
strict liability for response costs to hazardous substance cleanup cases. 7 '
A rationale posited for limiting application of the theory is that only
damages for direct harm to persons, real property or chattels are within
the scope of the doctrine, thus placing outside the scope of liability eco-
nomic harm such as excessive emergency service expenditures.t11
These damages, however, arguably do fall within the scope of strict
liability because they constitute harm that directly flows from the disas-
ter. 73 In addition, in most disasters at least some physical harm to a
170. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(2) (1977); Prosser & Keeton, supra note
40, § 79, at 560; see also Gronn v. Rogers Constr., Inc., 221 Or. 226, 230, 350 P.2d 1086,
1088 (1960) (denying recovery for mink farm economic loss allegedly caused by defend-
ant's blasting operations because harm sustained not found to be within general risk
presented by defendant's activities).
An important advantage to a plaintiff of the use of the strict liability theory is that it
avoids the sometimes insurmountable burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that defendant was at fault when the accident obliterates all of the evidence. See,
e.g., Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 455, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (1972) (using this
problem of proof in a wrongful death action to justify the imposition of strict liability on
defendant gasoline transporter), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973); see also National Steel
Serv. Center, Inc. v. Gibbons, 319 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 1982) (liability imposed for
property damages arising from explosion of common carrier's railroad tank car; court
observed that "[t]he carrier was in a better position to investigate and identify the cause
of the accident. When an accident destroys the evidence of causation, it is fairer for the
carrier to bear the cost of that fortuity."). Another alternative to the imposition of strict
liability when such problems of proof are presented is the use of res ipsa loquitur. See
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 329 (9th Cir.) (applying res ipsa loquitur
in action seeking damages for the deposition of flouride gas on plaintiff's property), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958); see also California Dep't of Fish & Game v. S& Bourne-
mouth, 318 F. Supp. 839, 841-42 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (cleanup costs for oil spill awarded in
admiralty action on basis of res ipsa loquitur theory).
171. See State v. Ventron Corp., 94 N.J. 473, 488, 468 A.2d 150, 157 (1983) (mercury
pollution); Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 NJ. Super. 447, 462-63,
419 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Law Div. 1980) (pollution from waste oil reprocessing and canning
facility); State v. Arlington Warehouse, 203 N.J. Super. 9, 14-15, 495 A.2d 882, 885
(App. Div. 1985) (toxic chemicals discharged in fire at defendant's warehouse); cf Penn-
sylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117, 120 nn.3 & 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (declin-
ing to rule on volatile issue of whether operation of a nuclear power plant constitutes an
abnormally dangerous activity creating liability for emergency response costs); Union Oil
Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 n.3 (9th Cir. 1974) (declining to reach issue whether
defendant's oil drilling activities constituted an ultra-hazardous activity for purposes of
liability for oil spill response costs).
172. See e.g., In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 857-58 (M.D.
Pa. 1982) (holding that "purely economic losses" are not recoverable on a strict liability
theory without a showing that the losses flowed from harm to persons, land or chattel),
aff'd in part, vacated, and remanded in part sub nom. Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils.
Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983).
173. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 comment d at 35 (1977) explaining the
strict liability rule as follows:
The liability arises out of the abnormal danger of the activity itself, and the risk
that it creates, of harm to those in the vicinity. It is founded upon a policy of
the law that imposes upon anyone who for his own purposes creates an abnor-
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"person, land or chattels"' 74 is likely to be sustained, and the cost of any
materials or services provided in response to such an event is part and
parcel of the "direct" harm."' Finally, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts distinguishes between the terms "harm" and "physical harm"' 7 6
and applies the strict liability rule only to "harm."'" Liability for eco-
nomic loss therefore is not explicitly excluded under the rule.,"
F. Quasi-contract Theory of Recovery
A number of courts have considered restitution as a basis for recovery
of disaster response costs. 17 9 This theory of recovery was used success-
fully in Brandon Township v. Jerome Builders, Inc. '80 In Brandon, plain-
mal risk of harm to his neighbors, the responsibility of relieving against that
harm when it does in fact occur. The defendant's enterprise, in other words, is
required to pay its way by compensating for the harm it causes, because of its
special, abnormal and dangerous character.
Id. (emphasis added).
174. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519(1) (1977).
175. For example, in Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.
1983), the Third Circuit remanded on the economic loss issue for development of plain-
tiff's argument that the increased radioactivity and radioactive materials emitted during
the nuclear incident at Three Mile Island constituted a sufficient showing of physical
harm or injury to allow recovery for the damages flowing from such harm. See id. at 122-
23. The Court never decided the issue because the parties settled the case without a
further trial (telephone conversation with Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General,
November 11, 1986). Similarly, in District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077
(D.C. Cir. 1984), damage to government property, the 14th Street/Rochambeau Bridge,
was sustained during the course of the aircrash. See id. at 1079.
176. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7 (1965).
177. See supra note 166. Compare Restatement (Second) of Torts § 519 (1977) (one
carrying on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for "harm" to person,
land or chattels of another) with Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (stating
the rule that a seller of an unreasonably dangerous product is strictly liable for "physical
harm").
178. See Brief of Appellant at 24 & n.20, Pennsylvania v. General Pub. Utils. Corp.,
710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983) (No. 82-3421).
Additional support for the expansion of strict liability beyond present limits comes
from the theory of equitable risk distribution theory, discussed supra notes 77 & 83-84
and accompanying text; see also Calabresi II, supra note 83, at 541-43 (arguing for expan-
sion of liability for "extra-hazardous" activities beyond present limits); Common Carriers,
supra note 77, at 450-55 (arguing for the imposition of strict liability on common carriers
of hazardous materials on basis of risk distribution theory).
179. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204.06 (1967); United
States v. P/B STCO 213, 756 F.2d 364, 370-76 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Boyd,
520 F.2d 642, 644-45 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); Brandon Town-
ship v. Jerome Builders, Inc., 80 Mich. App. 180, 183, 263 N.W.2d 326, 328 (1977); State
v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 103 A.D.2d 33, 38-39, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1014 (3d Dep't
1984); see also United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 130 F.2d 308, 311 (4th Cir. 1942)
(declining to rule on quasi-contract theory but ruling for plaintiff on other grounds);
Allenton Vol. Fire Dep't v. Soo Line R.R., 372 F. Supp. 422, 423 (E.D. Wis. 1974)(rejecting quasi-contract theory of recovery for fire suppression costs); cf United States v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 580 F.2d 1122, 1126-29 (2d Cir. 1978) (allowing recovery of
costs incurred by the Atomic Energy Commission in supplying electric power to defend-
ant utility company during serious power shortage on theory of quasi-contract).
180. 80 Mich. App. 180, 263 N.W.2d 326 (1977).
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tiff Township had repeatedly warned defendants to repair their dam
which was in imminent threat of breaking."8' Despite the warnings, de-
fendants failed to act. 182 The Township was then forced to take emer-
gency action to repair the dam in order to avoid a collapse' 13 and
thereafter brought an action for recovery of its emergency response
costs. 1 The court held that because plaintiff had performed defendants'
duty, it was entitled to recover its response costs based on defendants'
unjust enrichment. 18 5
An additional argument can be made in favor of a quasi-contractual
theory of recovery. In causing a disaster, a tortfeasor has a duty to mini-
mize the risk of harm created. 8 6 If the government is forced to assume
this duty, it should be entitled to restitution for the cost of performance
181. See id. at 182, 263 N.W.2d at 327.
182. See id.
183. See id. The court observed "[b]ecause of heavy spring rainfall and runoff plaintiff
determined that there was an imminent threat to the health, safety and welfare of town-
ship residents, and therefore repaired the dam and made it safe." Id.
184. See id. at 182, 263 N.W.2d at 327-28.
185. See id. at 183, 263 N.W.2d at 328. The court based its holding on the Restatement
of Restitution § 115 (1937) that reads:
[a] person who has performed the duty of another by supplying things or serv-
ices, although acting without the other's knowledge or consent, is entitled to
restitution from the other if
(a) he acted unofficiously and with intent to charge therefor, and
(b) the things or services supplied were immediately necessary to satisfy the
requirements of public decency, health, or safety.
The court in Brandon held that plaintiff's allegations "fall squarely within the situation
envisioned by the Restatement [of Restitution § 115]" and concluded that "[d]efendants
were enriched by the repairs made to its dam, and the enrichment was unjust because it
was defendants' duty to repair the dam." 80 Mich. App. 180, 183, 263 N.W.2d 326, 328.
The defense to a quasi-contract action that plaintiff acted "officiously" and therefore is
not entitled to recover is addressed in the Restatement (Second) of Restitution § 3 com-
ment a (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983):
[s]ome cases within the principle of this section are marked by a more or less
compelling responsibility resting on the claimant to act as he did. So far as
officiousness might otherwise be charged against him, the charge is cancelled by
a belief that he would have been in some sense delinquent if he had done noth-
ing in response to the situation of need.
Il at 45; cf. Town of East Troy v. Soo Line R.R., 653 F.2d 1123, 1128-32 (7th Cir. 1980)
(in response cost recovery action rejecting defense that town voluntarily acted in abating
a public nuisance on ground that town is obligated to provide for the health, safety and
welfare of its citizens), cert denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981).
186. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321 (1965) providing in pertinent part that
"[i]f the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created
an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect." Comment a to § 321 explains that
"[i]f the act is negligent, the actor's responsibility continues in the form of a duty to
exercise reasonable care to avert the consequences which he recognizes or should recog-
nize as likely to follow." Id.; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 322 (1965) (duty
to prevent further harm to others if have already caused injury). Comment a to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 322 explains that if the actor's
act, or an instrumentality within his control, has inflicted upon another such
harm that the other is helpless and in danger, and a reasonable man would
recognize the necessity of aiding or protecting him to avert further harm, the
1987] 1033
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
in terms of the money saved by the tortfeasor. 87
G. Contract Theory of Recovery
If plaintiff and defendant have a contract and an emergency situation
arises in connection with the contract, recovery for emergency service
costs can be based on a breach of contract theory. Successful use of this
theory is illustrated by United States v. Morehart.8  In Morehart, de-
fendant had an agreement to perform certain work for plaintiff1 8 9 and,
during performance, negligently started a fire.190 The court held that the
agreement created an "implied-in-law covenant" to perform the work in
a "workmanlike manner""19 and that defendant's breach of the covenant
through his failure to exercise due care created liability for fire suppres-
sion costs.192
actor is under a duty to take such action even though he may not have been
originally at fault.
Id.
187. This argument can be based on several sections of the Restatement of Restitution
(1937) including § 112 (restitution recoverable where benefit conferred upon another
under circumstances making such action necessary for the protection of the interests of
the other or of third persons); § 113 (restitution recoverable for performance of another's
noncontractual duty to supply necessaries to a third person); § 114 (restitution allowed
for performance of another's duty to a third person in an emergency); and, § 115 (restitu-
tion for performance of another's duty to the public). E.g., Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Navigation Co. v. Overseas Oil Carriers, Inc., 553 F.2d 830, 834 (2d Cir.) (imposing
liability based on Restatement of Restitution § 114 for costs incurred by private plaintiff
during emergency medical rescue at sea), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
Finally, a cause of action for recovery of emergency response costs might also be based
on the Restatement (Second) of Restitution § 3 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1983), which reads:
A person may be unjustly enriched by receiving a benefit, although not re-
quested by him, through another's action to satisfy a need, either public or pri-
vate, in circumstances of exigency. He may be so enriched by money, credit,
goods, or services provided to him or for his account.
Id. The rule in admiralty law that a salvor, or rescuer, is entitled to a reasonable reward
for saving a ship, see R. Posner, supra note 83, at 104, is analogous to these proposed
causes of action based on restitution.
188. 449 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1971).
189. See id. at 1283-84. The agreement was that in exchange for agricultural conserva-
tion money, defendant would clear his land of brush and would be reimbursed by the
government for part of his cost. See id. at 1283.
190. See id. at 1283 & n.1.
191. Id. at 1284.
192. See id. at 1283. In holding defendant liable, the court also noted that the expendi-
ture incurred by plaintiff was one "in mitigation of damages that would have occurred
had the fire remained unchecked." Id. at 1284 n.3.
In addition, if there were to exist a prior agreement between the government and the
defendant that, in the event of a disaster, the former would be reimbursed by the latter,
then recovery could be based on a contract theory of indemnification. See, e.g., Southern
Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 415 F.2d 758, 758-59 (9th Cir.) (power company liable
pursuant to provision contained in defendant's special use permit imposing liability for
expenses incurred by U.S. Forest Service in extinguishing fires originating on defendant's
right of way), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957 (1969); cf City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 146
N.J. Super. 169, 179-80, 369 A.2d 49, 55 (Law Div. 1976) ("If the facts were to develop
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III. STATUTORY ENHANCEMENTS
Deference to legislatures is used to deny common law liability for dis-
aster response costs.1 93 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Air Florida ruled that because the
"government's decision to provide tax-supported services is a legislative
policy determination,"'1 94 the legislature, not the court, was the proper
forum in which to address the issue. 195
Countering the statutory deference argument is the observation that
tort theories often implicate legislative concerns without a court declin-
ing to rule on the issue.1 96 Also, it is unlikely that any undue burden on
the court system will result from recognition of response cost liability
because calculation of the dollar amounts involved in a disaster response
is a relatively simple matter. 97 In addition, there are settled principles of
law already in place such as foreseeability that can easily be applied by
that the city's action was taken only because it was told by the owner that it would be
reimbursed, an action for breach of contract would be appropriate.").
193. See District of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 323-24 (9th Cir. 1983);
People v. Wilson, 240 Cal. App. 2d 574, 576-77, 49 Cal. Rptr. 792, 794 (1966); Mayor of
Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot, Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 688 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Town of
Howard v. Soo Line R.R., 63 Wis. 2d 500, 503, 217 N.W.2d 329, 330 (1974).
194. Air Florida, 750 F.2d at 1080.
195. See id.; see also City of Flagstaff v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322,
324 (9th Cir. 1983) ("the legislature and its public deliberative processes, rather than the
court, is the appropriate forum to address such fiscal concerns"). Subsequent to the City
of Flagstaff decision, the Arizona legislature passed a statute that imposes liability for
"extraordinary emergency services" required as a result of negligence or intentional mis-
conduct in the use, storage or transportation of hazardous substances. See Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 12-971 & 12-972 (Supp. 1986).
196. See Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972). In Amerada Hess, an admiralty action was brought seek-
ing recovery of compensatory damages and abatement costs incurred in an oil spill
cleanup. See idl at 1062. In holding that plaintiff had a viable common-law action, the
court rejected defendant's legislative deference argument, observing that
[t]he Court has not been directed to and indeed is unaware of any rule of law
which holds that the power of a state to legislate concerning a given matter
precludes the state from bringing a common law suit to accomplish the same
purpose and to redress the same wrong which a statute might seek to correct.
This result would violate common sense; for if a state in order to best serve the
public interest has the power to legislate regarding a given subject matter, does
it not follow that the state also has the inherent power to protect the public
welfare by bringing common law suits which seek to attain the same result as
that which legislation would seek to accomplish?
Iad at 1066-67; cf Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 552, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (1984) (in
imposing common law liability on social host in action arising out of drunken driving
accident, court rejects legislative deference argument, noting that "[determinations of
the scope of duty in negligence cases has traditionally been a function of the judiciary").
197. See e.g., Town of East Troy v. Soo Line RL.R, 653 F.2d 1123, 1133-34 (7th Cir.
1980) (holding that expert testimony as to the reasonableness of itemized expenses, bills
and cancelled checks to be sufficient evidence of costs incurred in remedying toxic chemi-
cal spill), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922 (1981); Mayor of Morgan City v. Jesse J. Fontenot,
Inc., 460 So. 2d 685, 686-87 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (simple itemization of costs incurred by
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the courts in common law cost recovery actions. 98
Although this Note takes the position that common law theories of
recovery should be expanded to encompass most, if not all, disaster re-
sponse cost claims, to present a complete treatment of the issue, an alter-
native statutory basis for recovery must be discussed. Use of a statute or
regulation to impose liability on tortfeasors for disaster response costs is
considered an exception to the general rule that proscribes tortfeasor lia-
bility.'9 9 A related exception provides that liability can be imposed in
order to "effect the intent of federal legislation." 2" This latter exception
arguably gives a potential plaintiff latitude to build an argument for im-
posing liability, as many areas of activity that have the potential for caus-
ing major disasters already are regulated heavily. Activities such as
handling toxic substances or hazardous wastes, 201 nuclear power genera-
tion20 2 and petroleum product transportation203 fall within this heavily
regulated category.
The exception 2° also applies to state statutes. In addition to state haz-
ardous substance20 5 and oil spill cleanup liability statutes, 20 6 state stat-
plaintiff during emergency response activities). For examples of the dollar amounts
sought in various disaster response cost recovery actions see supra note 25.
Even if there were difficult issues of fact to resolve, such difficulties would be a poor
excuse for a court to avoid the issue. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d
912, 919, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 79 (1968) ("[T]he difficulties of adjudication [should not]
frustrate the principle that there be a remedy for every substantial wrong.") (quoted In
People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 259-60 n.2, 495 A.2d
107, 114 n.2 (1985)).
198. Cf People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 263-64, 495
A.2d 107, 116 (1985) (applying foreseeability principles to allow recovery of economic
loss sustained as a result of a negligently caused disaster).
199. See City of Flagstaffv. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 719 F.2d 322, 324 (9th Cir.
1983).
200. See id.
201. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-31 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) ("Superfund" legislation im-
posing liability for cost of cleanup of hazardous wastes on responsible parties). See gener-
ally Note, Federal and State Remedies to Cleanup Hazardous Waste Sites, 20 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 379 (1986) (discussion of federal and state statutory remedies).
202. See Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982 & Supp. 111 1985) (imposing
limited liability on nuclear power plant owners and operators for damages incurred dur-
ing a nuclear incident or ENO (Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence)). Past use of the
Price-Anderson Act as a vehicle for recovery of emergency response costs, however, has
not proven successful. See In re TMI Litig. Gov't Entities Claims, 544 F. Supp. 853, 855-
56 (M.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd in part, vacated, and remanded in part sub nom. Pennsylvania
v. General Pub. Utils. Corp., 710 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1983).
203. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (authorizing reimbursement from
responsible parties for the cost of oil spill cleanup efforts); see also United States v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 737 (5th Cir. 1980) (33 U.S.C. § 1321 is exclusive remedy
for recovery of oil spill cleanup costs). See generally Note, Statutes of Limitations in
United States Suits to Recover Oil Spill Cleanup Costs Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 903, 910-18 (1985) (arguing that a six-year statute of
limitation should apply in oil spill response cost recovery action based on the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982)).
204. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-4707 (1985 Supp.) (liability for hazardous sub-
stance emergency cleanup expenses); Cal. Health & Safety Code § 13009.6 (West Supp.
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utes exist that impose response cost liability for negligent or intentional
setting of forest fires.207 Furthermore, at least one state has enacted a
disaster response cost recovery statute which is not limited solely to fire-
fighting costs, but encompasses disaster response costs generally.20 8
Although there are both advantages and disadvantages to the use of
statutes for the imposition of liability,2 "9 legislative bodies at all levels of
government would be well advised to consider passing disaster response
cost liability legislation to protect against the adverse financial effects2 °
of future man-made disasters. While awaiting the passage of such re-
sponse cost recovery legislation, recognition by the courts of common
law liability would avoid the problem of the remediless plaintiff who is
1987) (liability of responsible parties for expenses of emergency response to hazardous
substance release or threat); Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25352, 25360 (West Supp.
1987) (recovery of hazardous substance cleanup costs from responsible parties).
206. See, eg., Alaska Stat. §§ 46.04.010 & 46.04.080 (1980 & 1986 Supp.) (reimburse-
ment for oil spill cleanup expenses); Cal. Harb. & Nay. Code § 151 (West 1978), Cal.
Gov't Code § 8574.4 (West 1980) (liability for oil spill cleanup costs).
207. See, eg., Alaska Stat. § 41.15.160 (1983) (imposing double civil damages in addi-
tion to other criminal penalties).
208. See Va. Code Ann. § 44-146.18:1 (1986). The statute establishes a Disaster Re-
sponse Fund, and authorizes the administrator of the Fund to "promptly seek reimburse-
ment from any person causing or contributing to an emergency or disaster for all sums
disbursed from the fund for the protection, relief and recovery from loss or damage
caused by such person." Va. Code Ann. § 44-146.18:1(3) (1986); cf Cal. Gov't Code
§ 53150 (West Supp. 1987) (imposing liability for expense of emergency response by a
public agency to incident caused by negligent operation of motor vehicle by person under
influence of alcohol or drugs); Cal. Gov't Code § 53151 (West Supp. 1987) (imposing
liability for expense of emergency response by public agency to incident caused by negli-
gent operation of boat or vessel by person under influence of alcohol or drugs); Cal. Gov't
Code § 53152 (West Supp. 1987) (imposing liability for expense of emergency response
by public agency to incident caused by negligent operation of civil aircraft by person
under influence of alcohol or drugs).
209. See R. Posner, supra note 83, at 343-46 (comparing common law with regula-
tions). A major disadvantage to plaintiffs of a statutory basis for recovery is that courts
often strictly construe the reimbursement statute provisions, thereby defeating recovery.
See, e.g., United States v. California, 655 F.2d 914, 916-17, 920 (9th Cir. 1980) (suit to
recover costs of suppressing fire in a national forest dismissed for failure to properly
comply with statute's claim filing provisions); United States v. Burlington N., Inc., 500
F.2d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 1974) (claim for fire suppression costs denied: "[]hen a statute
creates a cause of action not recognized at common law... a plaintiff must bring itself
within the terms of the statute"); Portsmouth v. Campanella & Cardi Constr. Co., 100
N.H. 249, 253-54, 123 A.2d 827, 830-31 (1956) (no recovery under New Hampshire fire
suppression cost recovery statute due to fact that plaintiff acted pursuant to statutory
duties as fire chief); State v. California Or. Power Co., 225 Or. 604, 612-13, 358 P.2d 524,
528 (1961) (no recovery under Oregon forest fire suppression cost reimbursement statute
due to finding that defendant did not fall within class of persons liable under the statute),
superseded by statute as stated in State v. Columbia Basin Elec. Co-op, Inc., 294 Or. 284,
290, 655 P.2d 1053, 1056 (1982) (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 477.001(17), 477.066-.069 (1985)).
But see People v. Southern Cal. Edison, Co., 56 Cal. App. 3d 593, 605-07, 128 Cal. Rptr.
697, 705-06 (1976) ($21,548.19 in fire suppression costs awarded pursuant to state reim-
bursement statute); State v. Boston & Me. R.R., 99 N.H. 66, 72, 105 A.2d 751, 755
(1954) (allowing recovery of fire suppression costs under state statute imposing absolute
liability on those causing fires).
210. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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harmed in a jurisdiction lacking such legislation. 2"
CONCLUSION
The American tort system is based on the principle that one generally
is liable for harm proximately caused. Among the costs to society of
negligently caused disasters are those expenses incurred during emer-
gency response efforts. These response efforts frequently not only save
human lives, but also mitigate damages both to society and to the
tortfeasor or his business or property. The common law provides ample
grounds on which to base liability for response costs when legislation
imposing liability is not already in place. It is only equitable that liability
for the cost of emergency response services be imposed directly on those
responsible in order to account for the true cost of accidents.
David C. McIntyre
211. Cf People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 259 n.2,
495 A.2d 107, 114 n.2 (1985) ("Absent forthcoming remedies from our coordinate
branches of government, it would seem to serve justice better for a court of law to fashion
a remedy in a particular case, and perhaps be corrected by the legislature, than for inno-
cent victims to have no redress at all.").
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